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The Epistemic Paradigm 91

The paradigm considered in this book is based on considerations that most
philosophers of science will find acceptable. Along with the dominant tradition
(e.g., Goldman, 1986), we regard it as an evaluative or normative paradigm,
not a purely descriptive one. This is an epistemic geostatistics paradigm which
distinguishes between three main stages of knowledge acquisition, interpreta-
tion, and processing as follows:
1. The prior stage. Spatiotemporal analysis and mapping does not work in
an intellectual vacuum. Instead it always starts with a basic set of assumptions
and the general knowledge base (7.
2. The meta-prior stage. The specificatory knowledge base S is consid-
ered, including hard and soft data.
3. The integration or posterior stage. Information from (1.) and (2.)
is processed by means of logical rules to produce the required spatiotemporal
map.
Each one of the above stages will be discussed in considerable detail in
the following chapters. The epistemic paradigm includes elements from both
the empiricist and the rationalist traditions (just as scientific reasoning com-
bines empiricist and rationalist approaches in an inseparable method). Within
the context of this paradigm, knowledge comes from a synthesis of concepts
and experience. The distinction between the prior and meta-prior stages is
not meant so much in a temporal sense. Rather the real meaning is that the
boundary line between the prior and meta-prior stages of the mapping paradigm
coincides with the boundary line between general and specificatory knowledge.
However, while the distinction between general and specificatory knowledge is
a matter of logic, the distinction between the prior and meta-prior stages is an
epistemic issue. At the prior stage, we process knowledge that has been char-
acterized as general on the basis of some logical arguments (Chapter 3, "The
General Knowledge Base," p. 73) and at the meta-prior stage we incorporate
knowledge which—again on the basis of logical arguments—is considered spec-
ificatory (Chapter 3, "The Specificatory Knowledge Base," p. 82). The use of
the terms prior and meta-prior is natural, in this connection. Prior knowledge
comes epistemically—though not necessarily genetically—before observational
experience. Meta-prior knowledge is born pragmatically from experience and
may change with use.

COMMENT 4.2 : I n th e view o f many researchers, Socrates wa s th e firs t

to clearly point out the distinction between the prior and meta-prior stages

('i.e., th e distinction between what one knows before experience with the spe-

cific situation and what one learns from the case-specific data). Indeed, sev-

eral references t o this distinction can be foundi n Plato's famous Dialogues

(von Foerster, 1962; Vlastos, 1971). I n hi s discussion with Menon, e.g.,
Socrates makes the point that education is in many cases not a transfer of

knowledge from teacher to student, but an awakening of the awareness of

knowledge already possessed by the student. Without this prior knowledge,

Socrates argues, experience cannot be gathered (at the meta-prior stage).