Page 111 - Modern Spatiotemporal Geostatistics
P. 111

92      Modern  Spatiotemporal  Geostatistics —  Chapter  4
            A  simple  yet  illuminating  (and,  perhaps, entertaining)  example may  help
        fix  certain  ideas  about  the  aforementioned  epistemic stages.
         EXAMPLE  4.1:  Imagine  Nature  as a furnished  house.  At  the  prior  stage  our
        general  knowledge  Q is that  Nature  bought the furniture from  KMart  (but  we
        have  not  seen any  specific  articles).  On  the  basis  of  Q,  we may derive  some
        conclusions  about  the  total  value  of  the  furniture  (e.g.,  no  article  is worth
         more  than  $200).  At  the  meta-prior  stage  we inspect  certain  articles  and we
        obtain  their actual values (case-specific knowledge S),  which improves our  prior
        estimate  of the total value of the furniture.
             Epistemically  important  qualities  of the  mapping  paradigm  are those that
        can  be determined  before the  event  (i.e.,  before the  phenomenon predicted  by
        the  map actually  takes  place).  With  this  in  mind,  we want  maps that  carry
        as  much  information  as possible,  that  are well-supported  with  evidence, and
        that  have a high  probability  of  being  correct  (rather  than  certain  correctness,
        which  is an aspect that  cannot  be guaranteed before the  event).
             Reflecting  upon such an epistemic  paradigm, the  BME  mapping approach
        was  proposed  about  a decade ago (Christakos,  1990,  1991a,  1992).  The  crux
        of  BME  is that  the  spatiotemporal  analysis  and  mapping  of  natural  phenom-
        ena  should  be  both  informative  and  cogent.  Due to  the  natural  variations
        and  uncertainties  involved  in the description  of such  phenomena, both of these
        requirements  involve  probabilities,  but  they  are conditional  probabilities  rela-
        tive  to  the  different  knowledge  bases  considered at  each  stage.  This  double
        epistemic  goal  of  BME  is summarized by the  following  postulate.
        POSTULATE     4.1:  BME  aims  at  informativeness  (in  terms  of  prior  in-
        formation  relative  to  the  general  knowledge  (?)  as well  as cogency  (in
        terms of posterior  probability  relative  to the  specificatory  knowledge  S).
        The  two  epistemic  ideals of  Postulate  4.1 are at the conceptual heart of  BME.
        Let  us, therefore,  examine them  in  more detail.  [Multipoint  mapping  will  be
        considered  in  this  section;  the  single-point  mapping  can  always  be derived as
        a  special case.]

         Prior  stage

        At  the prior  stage, the  probability  function  considered is relative to the general
        knowledge  Q,  i.e.,


        which  means "the  probability of the mapx map = (x^, Xk) S iven tne  general
        knowledge  base  Q  is p."  Another  way  of  expressing the  meaning  of  Equa-
        tion  4.1  is  by saying that  probability  judgments  about \ map  are relative  to
        knowledge  Q.  Furthermore,  an  interpretation  can  be  given  in  terms  of  the
        complementarity  idea of  Chapter 2 (p.  58):  Given §, the  probability  function
        (Eq.  4.1)  provides a measure of the relative quantity of random field  realizations
        in which  Xma P occurs over all  possible  realizations.
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