Page 65 - Contribution To Phenomenology

58 RICHARD M ZANER

substituting another expressive movement in place of the particular
phenomenon implied by his experience ([28], pp. 260-261).

Accordingly, he continues, our experiences of others are not simply of
their bodies (not even in special situations such as physical exams), nor
just their "souls" or "selves*'—these are not abstracted from each other;
rather, we experience embodied persons ([33]; [39]; [43]):

What we perceive are integral wholes, whose intuitive [i.e. perceptual]
content is not immediately resolved in terms of external and internal
perception . . . . The primary awareness, in ourselves, in animals and
in primitives, invariably consists of patterns of wholeness; sensory
appearances are only given in so far as they function as the basis of
these patterns, or can take on the further office of signifying or
representing such wholes (28], pp. 261, 264).

We experience others—the woman, her husband, the physicians,
etc.—as integral wholes, as embodied persons. In turn, it is the latter that
allows us to "see the worry'' in the "furrowed brows" and **wringing
hands," not to mention in her words and their paralinguistic features, in
her physiognomic expressions, etc. [3]—all of which occur in the actual
context and setting in which she is encountered [39].
Not only do we judge about "objective" things, but also hold various
beliefs and make knowledgeable judgments about a wide range of other
things too often regarded as merely "subjective," including the emotions:
remembering, touching, thinking mathematically, calculating, liking, being
happy, and on and on [35]. Judgments about these must also be based
on evidences, for otherwise there would be no way whatever for us to
make sense of that couple's worry or anger, or that physician's mistaken
interpretation. We experience the anger, claim to know about it, form
judgments about a wealth of affairs (e.g., the physician claimed they were
angry and that this was directed to him), and do so on the basis of some
mode(s) of awareness, alertness, or experience—^where evidence, however,
requires just certain of these modes, as they are the ones through which
the affair is at all encountered as just what it is (as "it itself').

IX. Dialogue

Talking and Ustening to situational participants, certain matters become
especially prominent and need emphasis. (1) In general, phenomenological