Page 66 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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PHENOMENOLOGY AND          THE CLINICAL EVENT           59

              inquiry serves  to  make  prominent the  contextual themes essential  to every
              clinical  encounter.  Of  course,  much  has  been  left  out:  the  intentionality
              of  experience,  the  differences  among  the  ongoing,  merely  operative
              mental  processes  (Bewusstseinserlebnisse)  and  active  awarenesses  {Ich-
              erlebnisse),  and  inner-time  consciousness,  to  mention  but  a  few.  A  full
              phenomenology  of  the  clinical  event  has  thus  been  merely  suggested.
                (2)  More  specifically,  making  sense  of  the  moral  dimensions  of  cases
              such  as  the  one  discussed,  requires  primary  focus  on  the  complex,
              multiple  relationships constitutive of  each encounter—at the core  of which
              is  the  physician-patient  relationship. To  consider  but  one  facet  of  this,  to
              engage  in  dialogue  with  the  patient  the  clinician  needs  to  encourage  the
              patient  (and,  where  they  are  significantly  involved,  others  in  the  circle  of
              intimates)  to  articulate  her  own  narrative.  In  Kleinman's  terms,  this  is  a
              sort  of  "mini-ethnography"  ([16],  pp.  248-250,  285)  that,  interlacing
              continuously with the  clinician's  narrative, helps  her to express  what things
              mean  for  her,  a  narrative  that  may  "remoralize"  her  experience  and  in
              that  sense  help  to  vahdate  it.
                The  clinician's  conduct  here  seems  very  much  like  what  I  have
              elsewhere  termed  "affiliation"  ([30];  [43],  pp.  315-319).  The  idea  is  that
              by  placing  oneself  in  the  lived  experience  of  the  patient—in  everyday
              terms,  "putting  yourself  in  her  shoes"—a  fundamental  moral  cognizance
              is  achieved.  This  act  does  not  signify  that  the  clinician  is  supposed  to
              think  about  the  woman's  situation  as  if  it  were  his  own:  '"what would you
              do  if  you  were  me?"  is  not  the  issue.  For  the  clinician—^whether
              physician,  nurse,  or  ethicist—is  precisely  not  the  woman.  But  that  is  not
              the  point  anyway.  It  is  rather  that  the  clinician  must  make  the  effort  to
              understand  the  woman's  circumstances  from  her  own  perspective,  as  she
              lives  and  understands  it—disclosed  contextually  through  her  discourse,
              word-choice,  paralinguistic  features,  bodily  demeanor,  etc.
                Phenomenologically,  the  patient  wants  the  clinician  not  merely  to
              understand  (competence),  but just  as  importantly, to  be understanding  (to
              take  care  of,  to  care  for).  In  this  respect,  the  basic  clinical  method  (for
              physicians,  nurses,  or  ethicists)  is  a  specific  form  of  dialogue ([41];  [44];
              [45])—not  merely  "mini-ethnographies," as  this  notion fails  to  capture  the
              crucial  interactions  characteristic  of  clinical  encounters.  It  is  not,  that  is,
              simply  a  matter  of  a  patient  telling  her  story,  the  physician  then  giving
              his  interpretive  version  of  what's  going  on,  etc.  It  is  rather  a  matter  of
             shared  talking and listening  (asking  and responding), whose  point is  to  find
              out  what's  wrong,  what  can  be  done  about  it,  and,  fundamentally,  what
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