Page 142 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources
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Design 6/119
              of issues are really not errors since they presumably were deter-   information can be reconstructed. In the absence of data, a phi-
              mined based on best industry practices at the time. For a risk   losophy regarding level gfproofcan  be adopted. Perhaps more
              assessment,  they  are normally  better  assessed  in  the Design   so than in other failure modes, hearsay and employee testimony
              Index if they relate to strength (wrinkle bends, low frequency   might be available and appropriate to varying degrees. The con-
              ERW pipe, etc) or in the Corrosion index if related to periods   servative and recommended approach is to assume higher risks
              with no cathodic  protection,  incomplete pipe-to-soil  reading   when uncertainty is high. As always, consistency in assigning
              techniques, etc.                           points is important.
                Actions  such as vandalism,  sabotage, or accidents  caused   This portion of the assessment invdves many variables with
              by the public are not considered here. These are addressed to   low point values. So. most variables will not have a large impact
              some extent in the third-party damage index and in the optional   on risk individually, but in aggregate, the scores are thought to
              sabotage module discussed in Chapter 9.    present a picture of the relative potential for human error lead-
                Many variables thought to impact human error potential are   ing directly to a pipeline failure.
              identified  here. The  risk evaluator  should  incorporate  addi-   Because the potential for human error on a pipeline is related
              tional knowledge and experience into this index as such knowl-   to the operation of stations, Chapter 13 should also be reviewed
              edge  becomes  available.  If  data,  observations,  or  expert   for ideas regarding station risk assessment.
              judgment  demonstrates  correlations  between  accidents  and
              variables such as years of experience, or time of day, or level
              of education.  or  diet,  or salary. then  these  variables  can be   A.  Design (weighting: 30%)
              included in the risk picture. It is not thought that the state ofthe
              art has advanced to that point yet.        This is perhaps the most difficult aspect to assess for an existing
                Human  interaction  can  be  either  positive-preventing   or   pipeline. Design and planning processes are often not well defined
              mitigating  failures,  or  negative-exacerbating  or  initiating   or documented and are often hghIy variable. Consequently, they
              failures. Where efforts are made to improve human perform-   are the most difficult to assess for an existing pipeline.
              ance, risk reduction is achieved. Improvements may be achieved   The suggested approach is for the evaluator to ask for evi-
              through  better  designs  of  the  pipeline  system,  development   dence that certain error-preventing actions were taken during
              of  better  employees,  and/or  through  improved management   the design phase. It would not be inappropriate to insist on doc-
              programs. Such improvements are a component ofrisk manage-   umentation for each item. If design documents are available, a
              ment.                                      check or certification of the design can be done to verify that no
                An important concept in assessing human error risk is the   obvious errors have been made.
              supposition that  small errors at  any point  in a process can   Aspects that can be scored in this portion of the assessment
              leave the system vulnerable to failure at a later stage. With   are as follows:
              this  in  mind,  the  evaluator  must  assess  the  potential  for
              human error in each of the four phases of a pipeline's  life:   AI.   Hazard identification   4 pts
              design, construction,  operation, and maintenance. A slight   A2.   MOP potential   12 pts
              design or construction error may not be apparent for years   A3.   Safety systems   10 pts
              until it is suddenly a contributor to a failure. By viewing the   A4.   Material selection   2 pts
              entire pipelining process as a chain of interlinked steps, we   A5.   Checks   2 pts
              can also identify possible intervention points, where checks
              or inspections or special equipment can be inserted to avoid a   Al. Hazard identification (0-4 pts)
              human error-type failure. Because many pipeline accidents
              are the  result  of  more than  one  thing  going  wrong,  there   Here, the evaluator  checks to see that efforts were made  to
              are  often  several  opportunities  to  intervene  in  the  failure   identify  all  credible  hazards  associated  with  the  pipeline
              sequence.                                  and  its  operation.  A  hazard  must  be  clearly  understood
                Specific items and actions that are thought to minimize the   before appropriate risk reduction measures can be employed.
              potential for errors should be identified and incorporated into   This would include all possible  failure modes in  a pipeline
              the risk assessment. A point schedule can be used to weigh the   risk assessment. Thoroughness is important  as is timeliness:
              relative impact of each item on the risk picture. Many of these   Does the assessment reflect current conditions? Have all initi-
              variables  will  require subjective  evaluations. The evaluator   ating events  been  considered?-even   the  more  rare  events
              should  take  steps  to  ensure  consistency  by  specifying,  if   such as temperature-induced overpressure? fire around the
              only  qualitatively,  conditions  that  lead  to  specific  point   facilities? safety device failure? (HAZOP studies and other
              assignments. The point  scores for many of these  items will   appropriate hazard identification techniques are discussed in
              usually  be  consistent across many  pipeline  sections  if  not   Chapter 1 .)
              entire systems.                              Ideally, the evaluator should see some documentation that
                Ideally, the evaluator will  find information  relating to the   shows that a complete hazard identification was performed. If
              pipeline's  design,  construction,  and  maintenance  on  which   documentation  is  not  available,  she  can  interview  system
              risk scores can be based. However, it is not unusual. especially   experts or explore other ways to verify that at least the more
              in the case of older systems, for such information to be partially   obvious scenarios have been addressed.
              or wholly unavailable. In such a case, the evaluator can take   Points  are  awarded (maximum  of  4  points)  based  on  the
              steps to obtain more information about the pipeline's history.   thoroughness of the hazard studies. with a documented, current,
               Metallurgical  analysis  of  materials,  depth-of-cover  surveys,   and  formal hazard  identification  process  getting the highest
              and research of manufacturers' records are some ways in which   score.
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