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Designing a risk assessment model 2/29
               Risk factors
                                                          Attributes andpreventions
               Tvpes of information
                                                          Because the ultimate goal of the risk assessment is to provide a
               Central to the design ofa risk model are the risk factors or vari-   means of risk management, it is sometimes useful to make a
               ables (these terms are used interchangeably in this text) that   distinction between two types of risk variables. As noted earlier,
               will be included in the assessment. A complete list of risk fac-   there is a difference between a hazard and a risk. We can usually
               tors, those items that  add to or  subtract from the amount of   do little to change the hazard, but we can take actions to affect
               risk, can be readily identified for any pipeline system. There is   the risk. Following this reasoning, the evaluator can categorize
               widespread agreement on failure mechanisms and underlying   each index risk variable as either an attribute or a prevention.
               factors influencing those mechanisms.      The attributes correspond loosely to the characteristics of the
                 Setting  up  a  risk  assessment  model  involves  trade-offs   hazard, while the preventions reflect the risk mitigation meas-
               between the number of factors to be considered and the ease of   ures. Attributes reflect the pipeline’s environment-character-
               use of the model. Including all possible factors in a decision   istics  that  are  difficult  or  impossible  to  change.  They  are
               support system, however, can create a somewhat unwieldy sys-   characteristics over which the operator usually has little or no
               tem. So, the important variables are widely recognized, but the   control. Preventions are actions taken in response to that envi-
               number to be considered in the model (and the depth of that   ronment. Both impact the risk, but a distinction may be useful,
               consideration) is amatter of choice for the model developers.   especially in risk management analyses.
                 In this book, lists ofpossible risk indicators are offered based   Examples of aspects that are not routinely changed, and are
               on their ability to provide useful risk signals. Each item’s spe-   therefore considered attributes, include
               cific ability to contribute  without  adding unnecessary  com-
               plexities will be a function of a user’s specific system, needs,   Soil characteristics
               and ability to obtain the required data. The variables and the   Type of atmosphere
               rationale  for  their  possible  inclusion  are  described  in  the   Product characteristics
               following chapters.                          The presence and nature ofnearby buried utilities
                 It is usually the case that some data impact several different
               aspects of risk. For example, pipe wall thickness is a factor in   The other category, preventions,  includes  actions  that the
               almost all potential failure modes: It determines time to failure   pipeline designer or operator can reasonably take to offset risks.
               for a  given corrosion  rate,  partly  determines  ability to  sur-   Examples ofpreventions include
               vive external forces, and so on. Population density is a conse-
               quence variable as well as a third-party damage indicator (as a   Pipeline patrol frequency
               possible measure of potential activity). Inspection results yield   Operator training programs
               evidence regarding current pipe integrity as well as possibly   Right-of-way (ROW) maintenance programs
               active failure mechanisms. A single detected defect can yield
               much information.  It could change our beliefs about coating   The above examples of each category are pretty clear-cut. The
               condition,  CP effectiveness, pipe strength,  overall operating   evaluator should expect to encounter some gray areas of dis-
               safety margin, and maybe even provides new information about   tinction between an attribute and a prevention. For instance.
               soil corrosivity, interference currents, third-party activity, and   consider the proximity of population centers to the pipeline.
               so on. All of this arises from a single piece of data (evidence).   In  many  risk  assessments,  this  impacts  the  potential  for
               Many companies now  avoid the use of casings. But casings   third-party  damage to the pipeline. This is obviously not an
               were put in place for a reason. The presence of a casing is a mit-   unchangeable  characteristic  because  rerouting  of the  line  is
               igation  measure  for  external  force  damage  potential,  but  is   usually an option. But in an economic sense. this characteristic
               often  seen  to  increase  corrosion  potential.  The  risk  model   may be unchangeable due to unrecoverable expenses that may
               should capture both of the risk implications from the presence   be incurred to change the pipeline’s location. Another example
               of a casing. Numerous other examples can be shown.   would be the pipeline depth of cover. To change this character-
                 A great deal of information is usually available in a pipeline   istic  would mean  a  reburial  or  the  addition  of  more  cover.
               operation. Information that can routinely be used to update the   Neither of these is an uncommon action, but the practicality of
               risk assessment includes                   such options must be weighed by the evaluator as he classifies a
                                                          risk component as an attribute or a prevention. Figure 2.3 illus-
                 All survey results such as pipe-to-soil voltage readings, leak   trates how some of the risk assessment variables are thought to
                 surveys, patrols, depth of cover, population density, etc.   appear on a scale with preventions at one extreme and attributes
                 Documentation of all repairs             at the other.
                 Documentation of all excavations           The distinction between attributes and preventions is espe-
               0  Operational data including pressures and flow rates   cially useful  in  risk  management  policy  making.  Company
                 Results of integrity assessments         standards  can  be  developed to require  certain  risk-reducing
                 Maintenance reports                      actions to be taken in response to certain harsh environments.
                 Updated consequence information          For example, more patrols might be required in highly popu-
                 Updated  receptor  information-new   housing,  high  occu-   lated areas or more corrosion-prevention verifications might be
                 pancy buildings. changes in population density or environ-   required under certain soil conditions. Such a procedure would
                 mental sensitivities, etc.               provide for assigning a level of preventions based on the level
               0  Results of root cause analyses and incident investigations   of attributes. The standards can be predefined and programmed
                 Availability and capabilities of new technologies   into a database program to adjust automatically the standards to
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