Page 251 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice

NOTES 239

68. Carole McCartney, “Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales National
DNA Database: A Sceptical Approach,” Critical Criminology 12 (2004): 157;
Michael E. Smith, “Let’s Make the DNA Identification Database as Inclusive as
Possible,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 34 (2006): 288; Robert Williamson
and Rony Duncan, “DNA Testing for All,” Nature 418, 6898(2002): 585; Christine
Rosen, “Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases,” The New Atlantis (Spring 2003),
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/liberty-privacy-and-dna-databases;
D. H. Kaye and Michael E. Smith, “DNA Databases for Law Enforcement: The
Coverage Question and the Case for a Population-wide Database,” in D. Lazer,
ed., DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice, 247–84 (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Akhil Reed Amar, “A Search for Justice in Our
Genes,” The New York Times, May 7, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/
opinion/a-search-for-justice-in-our-genes.html; Kathleen M. Donovan and
Charles F. Klahm IV, “Prosecuting Science: The Rational Defence of Mandatory
DNA Databases,” Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 48 (2009): 412.
69. D. H. Kaye and Michael E. Smith, “DNA Databases for Law Enforcement,”
247–84.
70. Ibid.
71. Etzioni, Amitai, “A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine.”
72. Along the lines suggested by Sonia Suter in “All in the Family,” 309.
73. Jeremy Gans, “Something to Hide: DNA, Surveillance and Self-Incrimination,”
Current Issues in Criminal Justice (2001) 13: 168–84, http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030450.
74. Janet C. Hoeffel, “The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evi-
dence Meets the Criminal Defendant,” Stanford Law Review 42 (1990): 465,
533; Dan L. Burk and Jennifer A. Hess, “Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Con-
siderations in Forensic DNA Testing,” George Mason University Civil Rights
Law Journal 5 (1994): 17.
75. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, (1966), cited in Paul C. Giannelli, “ABA
Standards on DNA Evidence: Nontestimonial Identification Orders,” Criminal
Justice 24 (2009): 24.
76. Nicholas Soares, “The Right to Remain Encrypted: The Self-Incrimination
Doctrine in the Digital Age,” American Criminal Law Review 49 (2012): 2001,
2004.
77. Nicholas Soares, “The Right to Remain Encrypted,” 2001, 2004–5.
78. Michael S. Pardo, “Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause,” Iowa Law Review 90 (2005): 1870: “Non-verbal conduct,
however, may be testimonial: For example, the act of responding to a subpoena
by providing a requested object discloses one’s (1) knowledge that the object
exists, (2) possession of it, and (3) belief that the provided object is the one
demanded. Physical evidence, by contrast, is not ‘testimony’ and hence an
individual forced to disclose it is not protected, even if the evidence is com-
pelled and incriminating. This includes evidence (including DNA evidence)
taken from a suspect’s body.”
79. Nita A. Farahany, “Incriminating Thoughts,” Stanford Law Review 64, 2
(2012): 351.