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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
Phase 1:January 1 to February 27, 1998
After the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) gradually faded from the world stage, as media
attention turned to other world events. Despite thousands of deaths
and the dissolution of the FRY, the country was widely thought to be
at peace by the early months of 1998. In the first two months of 1998,
Kosovo rarely appeared in Western media, and diplomatic and politi-
1
cal efforts regarding Kosovo were minimal.
Although there was a notable increase in tensions between the two
sides since at least late 1997, there were relatively low numbers of
casualties on either side. Over the six months leading to the outbreak
of the first significant clashes in Kosovo in early March 1998, Western
leaders met through the Contact Group to discuss Kosovo on four
2
occasions and issued three press releases. The Contact Group, which
had been set up originally to deal with the Bosnian conflict, became
increasingly drawn into the Kosovo crisis, as tensions increased in the
province over 1997 and early 1998. The West, however, was also care-
ful not to push the Yugoslav authorities too hard on Kosovo, fearing
that its cooperation, which had proven critical in reaching and imple-
menting the Dayton Peace Accords, may be at risk. Keeping the
Yugoslavs on board over Bosnia was more important than the Kosovo
tensions at this stage. In terms of the West’s foreign policy toward the
Kosovo issue, as segmented in chapter 3, three aspects can be distin-
guished. The first, referred to as the strategic policy, addresses the
question: what end(s) is the policy trying to accomplish? In this
regard, the West’s main goal was greater autonomy for the Kosovo
Albanians similar to what Milosevic had taken away from them in
1989. According to the Contact Group statement of February 25, 1998,
“The Contact Group reiterated that it supports neither the independ-
ence nor the maintenance of the status quo . . . The Contact Group
supports an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY and recognises
that this must include meaningful self-administration.” 3
To achieve its strategic policy, the West’s tactical policies were crit-
ical. The first of these, referred to as tactical policy A, addressed the
question: what must the parties on the ground do to reach the end(s)
of the strategic policy? At this stage, this policy was relatively vague
and only called for dialogue between the Serbs and Albanians. The
second of these, referred to as tactical policy B, addressed the ques-
tion: what must we (the external third-parties) do to push the parties
on the ground to implement tactical policy A? To promote dialogue
between the two sides, the West’s policy involved a twofold approach.