Page 166 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

1403975191ts08.qxd 19-2-07 05:08 PM Page 131
131
THE KOSOVO CRISIS—THE MICRO REVIEW
The first, which relied on sanctions, used the remaining “outer wall”
of sanctions over the FRY from the Bosnian conflict as leverage.
According to Robert Gelbard, the U.S. special representative to the
FRY, “Kosovo is right there in the centre of those issues which can
4
allow for the end of that outer wall of sanctions.” The second part,
which relied on incentives, involved concessions to the FRY for coop-
erative behavior to date. Since the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995,
there had been a growing trend in the West toward welcoming the
FRY back into the international community and the normalization of
relations. These included the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with
EU countries in 1996; the lifting of UN sanctions that had been in
place since May 1992 in September 1996; EU preferential trade status
in April 1997; and a European Commission aid package worth $112
million in May 1997.
In late February 1998, Gelbard continued this trend when he trav-
eled to the FRY and offered a number of concessions to lure Belgrade
further into compliance on Kosovo and to reward them for influencing
the Bosnian Serbs positively with the implementation of the Dayton
5
Accords. These concessions included the acceptance of the FRY into
the Southern European Cooperation Initiative (SECI); landing rights
permission for JAT (Yugoslav) Airlines in the United States; increased
diplomatic representation for the FRY’s diplomatic office in New York;
and permission to establish a consulate in the United States. 6
Although Gelbard criticized the FRY on Kosovo and the status quo,
he was even more critical of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), stating,
. . . we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very strongly the
unacceptable violence done by terrorist groups in Kosovo and particu-
larly the UCK—the Kosovo Liberation Army. This is without any ques-
tion a terrorist group. I refuse to accept any kind of excuses. Having
worked for years on counterterrorist activity I know very well that to
look at a terrorist group, to define it, you strip away the rhetoric and
just look at actions. And the actions of the group speak for themselves. 7
This message had been a repetition from a day earlier in Pristina, in
which Gelbard had stated, “It is the strong and firm policy of the
United States to fully oppose all terrorists actions and all terrorists
organizations.” 8
Phase 2: February 28 to March 27, 1998
After the Drenica massacre, Western governments reacted in several
ways. At the multilateral level, an emergency meeting of the Contact