Page 169 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
relatively peaceful. Their political leadership, after all, was pursuing
Gandhi-like tactics of passive resistance and was philosophically
opposed to violence.
Events on the ground, however, had changed in important ways
by the end of 1997. In Bosnia, the importance of Serbia proper as a
guarantor of peace had diminished gradually as local leaders gained
greater powers and the Dayton Accords gained a stronger grip on
the population. The implementation of the accords was helping to
defuse tensions and moving people toward more moderate political
leadership. In Kosovo, the reverse was happening. Belief in Rugova’s
pacifism was losing the support of increasing segments of the
Albanian population that despairingly compared their unsuccessful
plight to that of other groups in the former Yugoslavia that had
gained independence through the use of force. This shifting alle-
giance took root in the emergence of the KLA that was ready to
fight for independence through an armed struggle. Small-scale KLA
provocations and Serb reprisals became increasingly common
throughout late 1997 and early 1998. Until February 28, 1998, the
violence had been random and bearable for the West. The Drenica
massacre—which was the FRY’s attempt to deal a crushing blow to
the KLA—increased the severity of the conflict to a new level and, as
a result, achieved the exact reverse of its intentions. The Drenica
massacre exposed the increasingly misplaced cost-benefit structures
of Western policy toward the FRY in dramatic fashion and made it
difficult for the West to maintain its previous stance. The violence in
Kosovo and the bloodshed in Drenica exposed just how high the
cost had become. On the other hand, while a return to war in Bosnia
was still a possibility, the FRY’s ability to determine such an outcome
had greatly diminished. As a result, the West’s commitment to its
Kosovo policy was more open to change, and pressure on the FRY
over Kosovo, which was previously minimal, could now be increased
significantly. Table 7.1 summarizes the changing aspects of Western
Kosovo policy.
As table 7.1 shows, Western policy did not change strategically
but only at tactical levels after the Drenica massacre. In terms of
tactical policy A, the key means by which the strategic policy was to
be achieved remained constant. However, to achieve the necessary
environment for dialogue, the FRY was required to make addi-
tional moves regarding its forces in addition to the provision of access
for humanitarian organizations. The greatest change in policy
took place in the West’s tactical policy B, which was completely
overhauled. Whereas the previous policy was heavily tilted toward