Page 173 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo
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                                                                 THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
                                                         the ground from the KLA through military campaigns, with less
                                                         regard for Western approval. After the Drenica massacre, the tougher
                                                         Western policy toward the FRY had some effect. After initially reject-
                                                         ing pressure for reform on grounds that Kosovo was an internal mat-
                                                         ter, the FRY leadership seemed to change course and offer a number
                                                         of concessions to appease the West. These included at least three calls
                                                         in March 1998 for direct negotiations with the Albanian leadership, a
                                                         request for the return of the Organization for Security and
                                                         Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, which had been asked to
                                                         leave several years before, and the signing of an education agreement
                                                         with the Kosovo Albanians to promote their return to the state edu-
                                                                                                               26
                                                                                                                 For
                                                         cation system from which they had been excluded since 1991.
                                                         most of April and May 1998, the Yugoslav authorities also showed
                                                         military restraint in Kosovo, and the United States took this opportu-
                                                         nity to use diplomatic pressure against both sides. In May, Richard
                                                         Holbrooke, considered by some to be a Milosevic expert, was asked to
                                                         assist with negotiations. Holbrooke had earned a reputation as a for-
                                                         midable diplomat by playing a significant role in bringing an end to
                                                         the Bosnian conflict in 1995. In Kosovo, Holbrooke’s efforts seemed
                                                         to be getting results with the first ever meeting between Rugova
                                                         and Milosevic on May 15, an encounter that suggested progress
                                                         toward the West’s tactical policy A. These gestures and concessions by
                                                         Belgrade led to the delay of some of the threatened sanctions. 27  The
                                                         West could see signs of progress and did not want to spoil the gains by
                                                         overplaying its hand. In a May 18 statement, it even went so far as to
                                                         praise Milosevic personally for his role in promoting dialogue, stating,
                                                         “The Contact Group is encouraged by the fact that President Milosevic
                                                         has taken personal responsibility for the start of dialogue ....” 28
                                                           Events on the ground, however, were overtaking what would
                                                         prove to be only hollow signs of progress. The death of Jashari and 80
                                                         other Kosovo Albanians in Drenica swelled the KLA’s ranks from
                                                         hundreds to thousands, and drew significant material and moral sup-
                                                         port from Albania and the Albanian diaspora throughout the West. 29
                                                         The KLA continued its central tactic of targeting FRY authorities, but
                                                         now on a much wider scale. By late May (May 23 and 24), the FRY
                                                         authorities, now facing a more formidable challenger with better
                                                         armaments, launched an offensive on KLA strongholds, particularly
                                                         focused on cutting supply lines near the Albanian border. This meas-
                                                         ure, however, led to a strong Western response involving the first
                                                         NATO military exercise linked to Kosovo and the implementation of
                                                         sanctions that had been put on hold since March. Pressure also came
                                                         from Russia, the traditional Serb ally, who attempted to act as an
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