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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
the ground from the KLA through military campaigns, with less
regard for Western approval. After the Drenica massacre, the tougher
Western policy toward the FRY had some effect. After initially reject-
ing pressure for reform on grounds that Kosovo was an internal mat-
ter, the FRY leadership seemed to change course and offer a number
of concessions to appease the West. These included at least three calls
in March 1998 for direct negotiations with the Albanian leadership, a
request for the return of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, which had been asked to
leave several years before, and the signing of an education agreement
with the Kosovo Albanians to promote their return to the state edu-
26
For
cation system from which they had been excluded since 1991.
most of April and May 1998, the Yugoslav authorities also showed
military restraint in Kosovo, and the United States took this opportu-
nity to use diplomatic pressure against both sides. In May, Richard
Holbrooke, considered by some to be a Milosevic expert, was asked to
assist with negotiations. Holbrooke had earned a reputation as a for-
midable diplomat by playing a significant role in bringing an end to
the Bosnian conflict in 1995. In Kosovo, Holbrooke’s efforts seemed
to be getting results with the first ever meeting between Rugova
and Milosevic on May 15, an encounter that suggested progress
toward the West’s tactical policy A. These gestures and concessions by
Belgrade led to the delay of some of the threatened sanctions. 27 The
West could see signs of progress and did not want to spoil the gains by
overplaying its hand. In a May 18 statement, it even went so far as to
praise Milosevic personally for his role in promoting dialogue, stating,
“The Contact Group is encouraged by the fact that President Milosevic
has taken personal responsibility for the start of dialogue ....” 28
Events on the ground, however, were overtaking what would
prove to be only hollow signs of progress. The death of Jashari and 80
other Kosovo Albanians in Drenica swelled the KLA’s ranks from
hundreds to thousands, and drew significant material and moral sup-
port from Albania and the Albanian diaspora throughout the West. 29
The KLA continued its central tactic of targeting FRY authorities, but
now on a much wider scale. By late May (May 23 and 24), the FRY
authorities, now facing a more formidable challenger with better
armaments, launched an offensive on KLA strongholds, particularly
focused on cutting supply lines near the Albanian border. This meas-
ure, however, led to a strong Western response involving the first
NATO military exercise linked to Kosovo and the implementation of
sanctions that had been put on hold since March. Pressure also came
from Russia, the traditional Serb ally, who attempted to act as an

