Page 175 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
In August alone, according to the UN High Commission for
Refugees, 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were forced to leave their
homes, bringing the total number of displaced within a range of
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Of greatest concern were the estimated 50,000
250,000–300,000.
homeless Kosovo Albanians living in makeshift camps in mountains
surrounding their villages. With winter beginning as early as
mid-October, these people could starve or freeze during the coming
months. The Serbian authorities claimed to be eliminating KLA
terrorist strongholds and supply lines bringing weapons in from
Albania, but the integration of the KLA within the local population
and the indiscriminate nature of the offensive led to what one German
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diplomat called “an empty country, a wasteland.”
In addition to the human cost, the hollow language of the previous
six months seriously placed the West’s, and especially NATO’s, credi-
bility at stake. NATO secretary-general Javier Solana was especially
concerned about this issue and often repeated a joke a Serb diplomat
told him: “A village a day keeps NATO away,” believing that the Serbs
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were mocking NATO. This statement, though simple, bore a certain
reality that directly related to the CNN effect. As long as the FRY’s
offensive in Kosovo was slow and methodical and avoided shocking
scenes of mass killing, it was believed that NATO would complain but
not intervene. Only when images became unbearably painful would it
be impossible for the West to ignore the situation in Kosovo.
To provide assistance to the Kosovo Albanians and to regain credi-
bility, the West, through the UN Security Council and NATO, passed
two important measures: UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and
a NATO activation warning (ACTWARN), on September 23 and 24,
respectively. At the UN, diplomats had attempted to pass a resolution
to deal with the FRY counteroffensive for over one month. The main
sticking point in passing a resolution came from Russian and Chinese
representatives, who were reluctant to pass any strong measures
against the FRY—especially any that referred to the use of force. The
final agreement did not refer to enforcement but instead called for a
cease-fire, withdrawal of forces from civilian areas, stronger interna-
tional monitoring, refugee return, unfettered access, for humanitarian
organizations, and increased negotiation toward a political solution.
The NATO measure put the organization one step closer to military
action through a limited phased air campaign warning code named
Operation Allied Force, although it was not a commitment to
action. 37
The FRY summer offensive from late July to late September caused
the largest number of casualties on the Albanian side since the beginning