Page 178 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE KOSOVO CRISIS—THE MICRO REVIEW
shelter elsewhere. This effort averted the potential mass starvation
that was feared with the onset of the winter and it normalized life for
most of the displaced. FRY authorities, for the most part, withdrew to
their pre-March levels, leading NATO to report that substantial com-
pliance on withdrawal, in line with international demands, had been
achieved by late October.
Policy Shift after the Gornje Obrinje Massacre
There was clearly a shift in Western policy after the images of Gornje
Obrinje appeared in Western media in late September 1998. During
September, while Western policy had become more aggressive
toward ending the Kosovo conflict, as demonstrated by the passage
of the aforementioned UN and NATO resolutions, the use of
Western military force was not approved and remained in the back-
ground. According to the NATO press statement of September 24,
1998, the activation warning took NATO “to an increased level of
military preparedness . . . the use of force will require further deci-
41
This was, as its name sug-
sions by the North Atlantic Council.”
gested, largely a warning. Western nations at this stage were prepared
to raise the level of rhetoric, but they were not seriously ready to
engage militarily. Many of NATO’s members in Europe, especially
France, Germany, and Italy, insisted that an explicit UN mandate was
necessary for any military action over Kosovo. 42 This reluctance to
move beyond words was also buoyed by the FRY’s announcement
that it had defeated the KLA and was withdrawing troops from
Kosovo. 43 This move, which was announced on September 28 as an
attempt to appease the West, seemed to have had some impact. In an
interview on the possible withdrawal, U.S. secretary of defense
William Cohen, for example, was positive about the FRY announce-
ment and stated that meeting the UN demands would negate any
possibility of military action. He even suggested that the KLA needed
to reduce its talk of war and engage in negotiations to end the con-
flict. 44 Whatever relief the FRY declaration may have had, however,
was quickly reversed by the Gornje Obrinje massacre and its media
images and framing, which led to notable tactical policy shifts, as
highlighted in table 7.3.
As table 7.3 demonstrates, the West made three notable tactical policy
shifts after the Gornje Obrinje massacre. The first of these related to
tactical policy A. Whereas the West had hoped to achieve Kosovo self-
administration through the promotion of dialogue between the two
parties, the realization was setting in at this stage that the two sides, or