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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
To make its demands more compelling, the West took a critical step in
its tactical policy by formally introducing the possibility of military
force for the first time by way of a NATO activation warning. As the
events during phase 3 demonstrated, the West was willing to move
policy even when the CNN effect was not a factor, but in a slower and
more meticulous fashion, as shown by the fact that it took over one
month of negotiating for a UN resolution to be finalized.
Phase 4: September 28 to October 27, 1998
The images from the aftermath of the Gornje Obrinje massacre of
September 26 delivered unexpected and highly emotive scenes from
Kosovo to the West for the second time during the civil war. These
images dominated Western television screens and newspapers from
September 29 to October 2 and led to an unprecedented degree of
coverage. Upon receiving the news in late September, an emergency
NSC meeting was called in Washington. Whereas Albright had previ-
ously been alone in supporting force as a solution for ending the crisis,
her approach now had much wider support, and other NSC members
who had been reluctant about military intervention were now more
favorable to the option. At the meeting, the NSC reached a pivotal
decision—if Milosevic did not withdraw his forces as called for by the
UN Resolution 1199, the United States would use military force
through NATO. 38 To get the message to Milosevic, Holbrooke was
sent to the FRY for intense negotiations that lasted nine days. To
make the threat more credible, NATO took the unprecedented step of
issuing an activation order on October 13, for a limited and phased air
campaign against the FRY that had a 96-hour deadline for initiation. 39
All 16 NATO members, including final holdouts such as France,
Germany, and Italy, agreed upon this measure.
The Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement and its implementation led
to a relaxation of tensions in Kosovo. The agreement was enshrined in
UN Security Council Resolution 1203, which was enacted on
October 24, 1998 and included a cease-fire, withdrawal, and a robust
international monitoring regime. The monitoring system, referred to
as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), was established to ensure
compliance with UN resolutions and to supervise elections for
Kosovo self-government, which were to be held within nine months
of the agreement. 40 After the agreement, several hundred interna-
tional monitors and a number of humanitarian and other international
organizations entered Kosovo and provided sought-after relief to
displaced Kosovo Albanians, who either returned home or were given