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UTILITY AND DECISION MAKING  573



                                        Table 13.10 Utility Of Monetary Payoffs for the Swofford Problem
                                        Monetary Value            Indifference Value of p        Utility Value
                                        E50 000                       Does not apply                10.0
                                          30 000                          0.95                       9.5
                                          20 000                          0.90                       9.0
                                              0                           0.75                       7.5
                                         20 000                           0.55                       5.5
                                         30 000                           0.40                       4.0
                                         50 000                       Does not apply                 0.0




                                        Table 13.11 Utility Table for Swofford Problem

                                                                                State of Nature
                                                                Prices Up      Prices Stable      Prices Down
                                        Decision Alternative       s 1              s 2               s 3
                                        Investment A, d 1           9.5             9.0               0.0
                                                                   10.0             5.5               4.0
                                        Investment B, d 2
                                                                    7.5             7.5               7.5
                                        Do not invest, d 3



                                      the entries in the utility table is U ij , which denotes the utility associated with decision
                                      alternative d i and state of nature s j . Using this notation, we see that U 23 ¼ 4.0.
                                      Expected Utility Approach

                                      We can now apply the expected value computations introduced in Section 13.3 to
                                      the payoffs in Table 13.11 in order to select an optimal decision alternative for
                                      Swofford, However, because utility values represent such a special case of expected
                                      value, we refer to the expected value when applied to utility values as the expected
                                      utility (EU). In this way, we avoid any possible confusion between the expected value
                                      for the original payoff table and the expected value for the payoff table consisting of
                                      utility values. Thus, the expected utility approach requires the analyst to compute the
                                      expected utility for each decision alternative and then select the alternative yielding
                                      the best expected utility. If there are N possible states of nature, the expected utility
                                      of a decision alternative d i is given by:



                                                                          X
                                                                           N
                                                                  EUðd i Þ¼  Pðs j ÞU ij              (13:15)
                                                                          j¼1
                                      The expected utility for each of the decision alternatives in the Swofford problem is
                                      computed as follows:
                                                        EUðd 1 Þ¼ 0:3ð9:5Þþ 0:5ð9:0Þþ 0:2ð0Þ  ¼ 7:35
                                                        EUðd 2 Þ¼ 0:3ð10Þþ 0:5ð9:0Þþ 0:2ð4:0Þ¼ 6:55
                                                        EUðd 3 Þ¼ 0:3ð7:5Þþ 0:5ð7:5Þþ 0:2ð7:5Þ¼ 7:50






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