Page 356 - Beyond Decommissioning

332 Beyond Decommissioning

– piping and equipment associated with this system should be characterized to gain a better
view of what to expect; and
– the assumptions made in the contemporary safety basis documents should be revisited and
documents revised as appropriate.

7.14.4 Inadequate as-built drawings lead to contact with
underground electrical line, Hanford Site, United States
[US Department of Energy, lessons learned data base #:
RCCC-06-0011 (available upon DOE authorization)]

Problem encountered: On the morning of 6/20/06, a Washington Closure Hanford
(WCH) Field Remediation (FR) subcontractor was performing road maintenance
on a gravel haul road with a motor grader. This was a work activity performed rou-
tinely since the beginning of backfill operations. While grading the road, the motor
grader caught the edge of a splice box/hand-hole enclosure buried under the haul road.
The tug on the enclosure caused the live line that ran from the enclosure to a junc-
tion box to disconnect from the junction box conduit. The act of pulling the cable out
of the junction box placed tension on the fuse connection, pulling and breaking the
lower fuse block from the main panel and dislodging a fuse in the panel. During
the event, the wires had melted the insulation and arced to the metal conduit.
The enclosure was not identified on any drawing, nor was it clearly marked in the
field per National Electric Code. There was another enclosure nearby that had been
located during a field walk down and was marked with a construction candle. No
one was injured and there was no damage to the grader.
Analysis: The electrical system involved in this event was installed several years
earlier by another remedial action subcontractor. As-built information was provided
and filed upon completion of the job. As-built data were retrieved from the files and
incorporated on drawings provided to the WCH subcontractor. The original as-built
information was not sufficient, however, to accurately reflect the features installed.
The WCH and their subcontractor relied upon the data and did not verify and mark
the physical location of the underground utilities, additional steps that could have
prevented this incident.
Lessons learned: Utility information on drawings should be considered approxi-
mate or incomplete, and appropriate field verification performed in planning for activ-
ities that could interfere with utilities.

7.14.5 Moving records into vaults after transition, Portsmouth,
OH, United States [US Department of Energy, lessons
learned data base #: B-2013-WEMSPORTS-001 (available
upon DOE authorization)]
Problem encountered: On November 4, 2011, WEMS’s Records Management Doc-
ument Control (RMDC) organization began relocating records and personnel from the
X-100 Building (the building was scheduled for demolition) to a newly redesigned