Page 35 - Decoding Culture
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28  DECODING CULTURE
          inductively  inferred  using  whatever are  the  currently  accepted
          observation  techniques.  To  Willer  and  Willer  this  is  'pseudo­
          science',  an  unacceptable departure from the  canons of proper
          inquiry. If so, of course, it has to be conceded that much effects
          research is pseudo-scientific. But whatever the force of that claim,
          this  divorce  of processes  of empirical generalization  from their
          theoretical context gives rise to a research practice emphasizing
          the goal of establishing direct correlations among variables at the
          expense  of understanding the  social  and psychological  mecha­
          nisms which  generate  the  correlation.  In the  limiting  case  this
          leads to  a behaviourist focus on stimulus-response associations,
          and even  in less restrictive conceptions it leads to a tendency to
          express 'findings' as superficial associative  statements. Scientific
          knowledge thus becomes no more than an empirically buttressed
          assembly of such generalizations.
             All this is reinforced by the familiar empiricist tendency to priv­
          ilege  precision,  thus favouring  indicators amenable  to  interval
          measurement. The most dramatic instance in effects research was
          the growth of content analysis during the tradition's heyday, from
           Berelson's  (1952) concern with 'objective,  systematic and quanti­
          tative'  content  data through  developing levels of methodological
           sophistication and computerization (Pool,  1959; North et at. ,   1963;
           Stone et at., 1966; Holsti, 1969; Gerbner et at. ,   1969). But, for all this
          obvious methodological invention, the processes through which
           media meanings were socially constructed remained largely unex­
           plored. As it had been in other respects, effects research proved to
           be trapped within a somewhat restrictive empiricist epistemology,
           only able to envisage the communication process in terms of atom­
           ized questions about effects.
             Consider, now, the social ontology presumed by this research
           tradition.  Superficially this is less internally consistent than is its
           characteristic epistemology. True, it is broadly individualistic, but





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