Page 45 - Decoding Culture
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38  DECODING CULTURE

           his response to Wellek's  (1937)  philosophical demand that he lay
           bare his assumptions and produce a theory in their defence, he
           falls back on the notion that what is required of philosophy is very
           different to that which is required of literary criticism.  One must
           avoid the pernicious consequences of 'queering one discipline with
                                          2
           the habits of another' (Leavis, 1952:  1 3) and so resist the tempta­
           tion to formulate general axioms of method. Leavis does grant that,
           over time, the critic may achieve consistency and coherence from
           which abstract principles may be inferred, but this is not the pur­
           pose of the critical enterprise. Leavis has quite other goals.

             I hoped, by putting in fr ont of them  [readers of poetry), in a criti­
             cism that should keep as close to the concrete as possible, my own
             developed 'coherence of response', to get them to agree  (with,  no
             doubt, critical qualifications)  that the map, the essential order, of
             English poetry seen as a whole did, when they interrogated their
             experience, look like that to them also. Ideally I ought perhaps  . .
                                                                 .
             to be able to complete the work with a theoretical statement. But I
             a m   sure that the kind of work that I have attempted comes first, and
             would, for such a theoretical statement to be worth anything, have
             to be done first.  (ibid: 214)

           I have quoted  this passage because it encompasses so many fea­
           tures of Leavis' tacit epistemology.  One should keep  close to  the
           concrete,  to - a favoured  concept  this - experience.  Theoretical
           statements can only be arrived at (if they should be advanced at all)
           after the fact:  only when the critic has done the work of concrete
           textual analysis might there be a place for theory. The idea that the­
           oretical presuppositions  inform,  even  constitute, the grounds on
           which  concrete  analysis  is  built  is bypassed  in the claim that the
           work comes first.  Leavis'  methodology,  then,  is  a form of induc­
           tivism. The skilled  observer  (critic)  examines  and explores the
           concrete material  (poetry)  and lays bare its 'essential order'. And
           then  the  readers  are  invited  to  'interrogate  their  experience'  so





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