Page 225 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources

9/202 Additional Risk Modules
In many cases, the threat from within the local community is Sabotage mitigations
greatest. An exception would be a more organized campaign
that can direct its activities toward sites in different geographic As the potential for an attack increases, preventive measures
areas. An organized guerrilla group is intuitively a more potent should escalate. However, any mitigating measure can be over-
threat than individual actions. come by determined saboteurs. Therefore, the risk can only be
An aspect of sabotage, probably better termed vandalism, reduced by a certain amount for each probability level.
includes wanton mischief by individuals who may damage Awarding of points and/or weightings is difficult to generalize.
facilities. Often an expression of frustration, these acts are gen- Most anti-sabotage measures will be highly situation specific.
erally spontaneous and directed toward targets of convenience. The designer of the threat assessment model should assign
While not as serious a threat as genuine sabotage, vandalism weightings based on experience, judgment, and data, when
can nonetheless be included in this assessment. available. Insisting that all weightings sum to 1 OGrepresent-
Experience in the geographic area is probably the best gauge ing 100% of the mitigation potential-helps in assigning
to use in assessing the threat. If the area is new to the operator, weights and balancing the relative benefits of all measures. In a
intelligence can be gained via government agencies (state sense, evaluating the potential for sabotage also assesses the
department, foreign affairs, embassies, etc.) and local govern- host country’s ability to assist in preventing damage. The fol-
ment activities (city hall, town meetings, public hearings, etc.). lowing sabotage threat reduction measures are generally avail-
The experience of other operators is valuable. Other operators able to the pipeline ownerioperator in addition to any support
are ideally other pipeline companies, but can also be operators provided by the host country.
of production facilities or other transportation modes such as
railroad, truck, and marine. A. Communitypartnering
To assess the attack potential, a point adjustment scale can be
set up as foIlows: One strategy for reducing the threat of sabotage and vandalism
is to “make allies from adversaries.” The possibility of attack is
Low attack probability 50-80 pts reduced when “neighbors” are supportive of the pipeline activi-
(situation is very safe) ties. This support is gained to some extent through general pub-
Although something has happened to warrant the inclusion of lic education. People feel less threatened by things that they
this module in the risk assessment, indications of impend- understand. Support of pipeline operations is best fostered,
ing threats are very minimal. The intent or resources of pos- however, through the production of benefits to those neighbors.
sible perpetrators are such that real damage to facilities is Benefits may include jobs for the community, delivery of
only a very remote possibility. No attacks other than ran- needed products (an immediate consumable such as heating oil
dom (not company or industry specific) mischief have or gas for cooking is more important than intermediate prod-
occurred in recent history. Simple vandalism such as spray ucts such as ethylene or crude oil), or the establishment of infra-
painting and occasional theft of non-strategic items (build- structure by the company. Threat of attack is reduced ifpipeline
ing materials, hand tools, chains, etc.) would score in this operators establish themselves as contributing members of a
category. community. In developing countries, this strategy has led to
agricultural assistance, public health improvements, and the
Medium probability 20-50 pts construction of roads, schools, hospitals, etc. Improvements of
This module is being included in the risk assessment because roads, telephone service, and other infrastructure not only
a real threat exists. Attacks on this company or similar improve the quality of life, they also have the secondary benefit
operations have occurred in the past year and/or conditions of aiding in the prevention and response to sabotage. An appre-
exist that could cause a flare-up of attacks at any time. ciative community will not only be less inclined to cause dam-
Attacks may tend to be propagated by individuals age to the facilities of such a company, but will also tend to
rather than organizations or otherwise lack the full measure intervene to protect the company interests when those interests
of resources that a well-organized and resourced saboteur benefit the community.
may have. Such a program should not be thought of (and definitely not
be labeled) as a bribe or extortion payment by the operating
High probability (threat 0-20 pts company. In some cases, the program may be thought of as fair
is significant) compensation for hsrupting a Community. In other cases where
Attacks are an ongoing concern. There is a clear and present the pipeline is merely used as a convenient target in a regional
danger to facilities or personnel. Conditions under which dispute that does not involve the operation at all, assistance pro-
attacks occur continue to exist (no successfd negotiations, grams can be seen as the cost of doing business or as an addi-
no alleviation of grievances that are prompting the hostility). tional local tax to be paid. Whatever the circumstances, a
Attacks are seen to be the work of organized guerrilla strategy of partnering with a community will be more effective
groups or other well-organized, resourced, and experienced if the strategy is packaged as the “right thing to do” rather than
saboteurs. as a defensive measure. The way the program is presented inter-
nally will affect company employees and will consequently
Assigning of points between those shown is encouraged spill over into how the community views the actions. Employee
because actual situations will always be more complex than interaction with the locals might be a critical aspect of how the
what is listed in these very generalizedprobability descriptions. program is received. If the pipeline company or sponsoring
A more rigorous assessment can be done by examining and government is seen as corrupt or otherwise not legitimate, this
scoring specific aspects of attack potential. assistance might be seen as a temporary payoff without long-