Page 228 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources

Sabotage module 9/205
Factors such as training and professionalism of personnel, sion, newspapers, and public postings are used, however, lit-
maintenance and sensitivity of devices, and response time to tle feedback is received from residents.
situations are all critical to the usefulness of the measure. As High-Widespread communication and campaigning for the
with the potential itself, scoring will necessarily be quite judg- project are conducted using the most effective modes to
mental. reach the most people. This may entail visits to villages, town
A basic assortment of protection measures such as fencing, meetings, etc., to hold sessions (in the native language) to
locks, signs, and SCADA can be scored for each station so deliver information and address concerns.
equipped. This package is a fairly normal arrangement for When attacks can be expected, the design phase presents the
pipeline facilities when there is no special sabotage threat. opportunity to do a few things to minimize the impact of the
Where a significant threat does exist, adding features such as attacks. Equipment can be selected that is more easily repaired
guards and detection devices can add points up to the maximum (availability of spare parts, ease of assembly/disassembly, sim-
allowed. A surface facility should never score as well as the ple design, etc.); aboveground facilities can be located with
absence of such a facility since its very existence creates a tar- defense in mind; and detection and prevention options can be
get for sabotage. included in initial designs. The degree of success and risk
reduction in these efforts is covered (and scored) in previous
Casingpipe variables.
While a buried pipeline is relatively inaccessible, casings are B. Construction
possible exceptions. As a special case of surface facilities, sec-
tions of buried pipeline that are encased in a casing pipe can be Installation of new facilities or modification of existing facili-
more vulnerable than directly buried pipe. The vulnerability ties provides many opportunities for sabotage. Defects can be
arises from the common use of vent pipes attached to the casing introduced and then concealed, counterfeit materials can be
that provide a direct route to the carrier pipe. An explosive substituted, equipment can be stolen or sabotaged etc. In
charge, dropped into a vent pipe, can then detonate against the today’s construction environment, a great deal of inspection is
carrier pipe. A simple prevention is to place bends in the vent often required to ensure that errors are not made and shortcuts
pipe so that a dropped object no longer has a direct access to the are not taken by constructors working against deadlines and
carrier pipe. If the bends are below ground level, would-be cost constraints. When the potential for intentional, malicious
attackers may not know that there is not an unrestricted path to acts is introduced, the problem is vastly compounded.
the main line. Permanent screens or other barriers on the vent Inspection efforts must be greatly expanded in order to have a
pipe entrance are also deterrents to this type of attack. fair chance of preventing such acts. Security must be present
even when work is not being performed in order to protect
Incorrect operations index equipment and property.
Points may be awarded based on the degree of security
In addition to the variables just discussed, other aspects of the offered during the construction phase:
pipeline’s design, construction, and operation can be examined Low-No special security measure are taken.
with the threat of sabotage considered. Since these aspects are Medium-The threat is acknowledged and planned for. Some
also covered to some degree in a standard assessment of human steps to increase security during construction are taken.
error potential as discussed in the Incorrect Operations Index Materials and equipment are secured; extra inspection is
(Chapter 6), the same categories can be used here. employed.
High-Extraordinary steps are taken to protect company inter-
A. Design ests during construction. These include
This is the first phase of a pipeline operation where attention 24-hour-per-day guarding and inspection
can be focused on the threat of attack. Route selection should Employment of several trained, trustworthy inspectors
take into consideration all political and security factors associ- Screened, loyal workforce-perhaps brought in from
ated with a proposed installation. Public relations will ideally another location
begin in the design phase, long before construction begins. System of checks for material handling
Even the presence of a survey crew can generate bad will and Otherwise careful attention to security through thorough
false rumors if neighbors are surprised by the activity. Project planning of all job aspects.
approval from national or regional government levels may not
be enough if this government is unpopular with the local resi-
dents. Whereas local approval may not be feasible for a number C. Operations
of reasons, any progress toward local support is valuable. For
purposes of this sabotage module, preparatory work done in the An opportunity to combat sabotage exists in the training of
design phase can be scored as follows: company employees. Alerting them to common sabotage meth-
ods, possible situations that can lead to attacks (disgruntled
Level ojSupport,for Project present and former employees, recruitment activities by sabo-
Low-National support only; no attempts are made to commu- teurs, etc.), and suspicious activities in general will improve the
nicate with regional or local residents. vigilance.
Medium-Some attempts are made to communicate the pur- An aspect of sabotage potential is intentional attacks by
pose of the project; more generalized modes such as televi- company employees or those posing as company employees.