Page 226 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources

Sabotage module 9/203
term commitment and will not have the desired results. It might C. Securityjbrces
be a difficult task to create the proper alliances to win public
support, and it will usually be a slow process. (See also the The effectiveness of a security force will be situation specific.
“Intelligence” section next.) Rarely can enough security personnel be deployed to protect
Community partnering can theoretically yield the most ben- the entire length of a pipeline. If security is provided from a
efit as a risk mitigator because removal of the incentive to government that is presently unpopular, the security forces
attack is the most effective way to protect the pipeline. When themselves might be targets and bring the risk of damage closer
such a program is just beginning, its effectiveness will be hard to the pipeline. It is not uncommon in some areas for pipeline
to measure. For risk assessment purposes, the evaluator might owners to deploy private security personnel. The evaluator
assess the program initially and then modify the attack poten- should look for evidence of professionalism and effectiveness
tial variable as evidence suggests that the program is achieving in such situations. Maximum value should be awarded when
its intended outcome. the security force presents a strong deterrent to sabotage.
Various elements of a community partnering program can be
identified and valued, in order to assess the benefits from the D. Resolve
program:
A well-publicized intention to protect the company’s facilities
Significant, noticeable, positive impact of program is a deterrent in itself. When the company demonstrates unwa-
Regular meetings with community leaders to determine how vering resolve to defend facilities and prosecute perpetrators,
and where money is best spent the casual mischief-maker is often dissuaded. Such resolve can
Good publicity as a community service. be partially shown by large, strongly worded warning signs.
These warnings should be reinforced by decisive action should
These elements are listed in priority order, from most impor- an attack occur. A high-visibility security force also demon-
tant to least, and can be additive-add points for all that are strates resolve. Maximum value should be awarded for a high-
present, using a point assignment scale consistent with the per- profile display that might include signs, guards, patrols, and
ceived benefit of this mitigation. In many cases, this variable publicized capture and prosecution of offenders.
should command a relatively high percentage of possible miti-
gation benefits-perhaps 2&70%. E. Threat ofpunishment

B. Intelligence Fear ofpunishment can be a deterrent to attacks, to some extent.
A well-publicized policy and good success in prosecution of
Forewarning of intended attacks is the next line of defense. perpetrators is a line of defense. The assessed value of this
Intelligence gathering can be as simple as overhearing conver- aspect can be increased when the threat of punishment is
sations or as sophisticated as the use of high-resolution spy thought to play a significant role. The evaluator should be
satellites, listening devices, and other espionage techniques. aware that a government that is not seen as legitimate might be
Close cooperation with local and national law enforcement deemed hypocritical in punishing saboteurs harshly while its
may also provide access to vital intelligence. Local police own affairs are not in order. In such cases, the deterrent effect of
forces are normally experienced in tracking subversives. They punishment might actually foster support for the saboteurs
know the citizens, they are familiar with civilian leaders, they [ 121. In many cases, threat of punishment (arguably) has a min-
can have detailed information on criminals and subversive imal impact on reducing attacks.
groups, and their support is important in an active anti-sabotage
program. However, some local police groups may themselves F Industry cooperation
be corrupt or less than effective. When the local police force is
seen as a government protection arm (rather than protection for Sharing of intelligence, training employees to watch neighbor-
the people), a close alliance might be counterproductive and ing facilities (and, hence, multiplying the patrol effectiveness),
even impact the effectiveness of a damage prevention program sharing of special patrols or guards, sharing of detection
1121. devices, etc., are benefits derived from cooperation between
The evaluator should be aware that effectiveness of intelli- companies. Particularly when the companies are engaged in
gence gathering is difficult to gauge and can change quickly as similar operations, this cooperation can be inexpensive and
fragile sources of information appear and disappear. Maximum effective. Maximum value should be awarded when a pipeline
value should be awarded when the company is able to reliably company’s anti-sabotage efforts are truly expanded by these
and regularly obtain information that is valuable in preventing cooperative efforts.
or reducing acts of sabotage. As a rough way of scoring this
item, a simple ratio can be used: G. Facility accessibility
Attacks will normally occur at the easiest (most vulnerable) tar-
Number of acts thwarted through intelligence gathering efforts 7
number of acts attempted gets and, as a secondary criteria, those targets that will cause the
most aggravation to have repaired. Such sites include the
Hence, if it is believed that three acts were avoided (due to remote, visible stations along the pipeline route (especially
forewarning) and eight acts occurred (even if unsuccessful, pump and compressor stations), the exposed piping on supports
they should be counted), then award 318 ofthe maximum point and bridges, and locations that will be difficult to repair (steep
value. mountain terrain, swampland, heavy jungle, etc.).