Page 227 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources

9/204Additional Risk Modules
The absence of such facilities is in itself a measure of protec- Staffing (value dependent on hours manned and number of
tion and would be scored as the safest condition. The underly- personnel)
ing premise is that a buried pipeline is not normally an High visibility (difficult to approach the site undetected;
attractive target to a would-be saboteur, due to the difficulty in good possibility exists of “friendly eyes” observing an intru-
access. Line markers might bring unwanted attention to the line sion and taking intervening action)
location. Of course, this must be weighed against the benefits Barriers to prevent forcible entry by vehicles (These may be
of reducing unintentional damage by having more signage. The appropriate in extreme cases. Ditches and other terrain
evaluator may wish to score incidences of line markers or obstacles provide a measure of protection. Barricades that do
even cleared ROW as aspects of sabotage threat if deemed not allow a direct route into the facility, but instead force a
appropriate. slow, twisting maneuver around the barricades, prevent rapid
Where surface facilities do exist, points should be subtracted penetration by a vehicle.)
for each occurrence in the section evaluated. The magnitude of Dense, thorny vegetation (This type of vegetation provides a
this point penalty should be determined based on how much barrier to unauthorized entry. On the other hand, it also pro-
such facilities are thought to increase the attack potential and vides cover for a perpetrator. Awarding of points is situation
vulnerability for the pipeline segment. Different facilities specific and should weigh the advantages and disadvantages
might warrant different penalties depending on their attractive- of such vegetation.).
ness to attackers.
Surface facilities such as pump and compressor stations are All detection-type preventions must be coupled with timely
often the most difficult and expensive portions of the pipeline response unless the detection device is solely for purposes of
system to repair. Use of more sophisticated and complex equip- later apprehension and prosecution of trespassers. Options,
ment often requires associated delays in obtaining replacement listed in roughly priority order (most valuable to least) are listed
parts, skilled labor, and specialized equipment to effect repairs. here:
This is fiuther reason for a stronger defensive posture at these
sites. Detection- Type Preventions
Preventive measures for unintentional third-party intrusions Staffing (Give maximum value for full-time staffing with
(scored in the third-party damage index) offer some overlap multiple personnel at all times.)
with mischief-preventing activities (fences around above- Video surveillance, real-time monitoring and response
ground facilities, for example) and are sometimes reconsidered Video surveillance, for recording purposes only
in this module. More points should be awarded for devices and Alarms, with timely response: motion detectors (infrared,
installations that are not easily defeated. The presence of such trip beams, trip wires, pressure sensors on floor, etc.) and
items better discourages the casual intruder. Preventive meas- sound detectors (may not be feasible in a noisy station)
ures at each facility can bring the point level nearly to the point Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
of having no such facilities, but not as high as the score for “no (Such a system can provide an indication of tampering with
vulnerable facilities present.” This is consistent with the idea equipment because the signal to the control room should
that “no threat” (in this case “no facility”) will have less risk change as a transmitter or meter changes.)
than “mitigated threat,” regardless of the robusmess of the miti- Satellite surveillance, with increasingly better resolution
gation measures. From a practical standpoint, this allows the (Such an option is viable today for observing a pipeline and
pipeline owner to minimize the risk in a number of ways the surrounding area continuously or at any appropriate
because several means are available to achieve the highest level interval.)
of preventive measures to offset the point penalty for the sur- Explosive dye markers (These are devices that spray a dye on
face facility. However, it also shows that even with many pre- a perpetrator to facilitate apprehension and prosecution.)
ventions in place, the hazard has not been removed. Mitigations
can be grouped into two categories: barrier-type preventions, Patrolling is already scored in the third-party damage index.
where physical barriers protect the facility, and detection-type Varying the patrol and inspection schedules enhances this as a
preventions, where detection and response are a deterrent. sabotage prevention measure.
The “penalty” assigned for the presence of surface facilities Any of the above measures can also be simulated rather than
can be reduced for all mitigative conditions at each facility real. Examples of simulated measures include plastic that
within the pipeline section evaluated. Some common mitiga- appears to be steel bars, fake cameras, and signs of warning
tion measures or conditions, in roughly priority order from measures that do not exist. While obviously not as effective as
most effective to least, are listed here: the genuine deterrents, these are still somewhat effective and
some mitigation credit can be awarded.
Burrier- Type Preventions Preventive measures are most effective in discouraging the
Electrified fence in proper working condition casual mischief-maker. The more sophisticated aggressor who
Strong fencdgate designed to prevent unauthorized entry by is intent on causing harm to a specific facility will most likely
humans (barbed wire, anti-scaling attachments, heavy-gauge infiltrate the facility and defeat the detection devices, regard-
wire, thick wood, or other anti-penetration barrier) less of the measures employed. With more modern technology,
Normal fencing (chain link, etc.) attack is also possible from greater distances.
Strong locks, not easily defeated Other equivalent prevention actions and devices can be simi-
Guards (professional, competent) or guard dogs (trained) larly scored within the spirit of the ranking lists. Note; In all
Alarms, deterrent type, designed to drive away intruders with awarding of values, the evaluator is cautioned to carefully study
lights, sounds, etc. the “real-world effectiveness of the antisabotage measure.