Page 354 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources
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QRAquality 14/329
              of accidents that would affect one or more persons, on average, is less   How to evaluate the quality of a QRA
              than 6.OE-07  chancedyear, or one chance in 1.7 million.
                                                       The  following  are  common  errors  seen  in  QRA  studies.
               Historical data on fatal accidents involving natural gas gathering   A  check  for these  can be used as a  simple audit  of a QRA
              and transmission pipelines have been compiled by the Department of   report.
              Transportation (DOT). During the 14.5 years for which summary data
              are available, the maximum  number  of fatalities  due to any single   0  Failure to define clearly the  scope and  boundaries  of the
              accident was six, and only two accidents caused six fatalities. For the   study
              pipeline/well network involved in this study, the maximum expected   0  Failure to cover all relevant hazards
              number of fatalities for any single accident is five on average.
                                                         Insufficient failure cases
               To put this type of evaluation into perspective, it is instructive to   0  Screening of failure data, optimistic assumptions and other
              look at the types of risks people are ordinarily exposed to during day-   biases tending to produce low-risk results
              to-day life. There are voluntary activities (driving a car) and involun-   0  Concentration of modeling and risk reduction effort on haz-
              tary activities (being hit by  lightning) that involve risks higher than   ards that do not dominate the risks
              those due to this pipeline/well network.   0  Lack of attention to escalation ofhydrocarbon events
                                                       0  Use of only one risk measure
                                                       0  Failure to define individual risk
                                                         Use of assumptions even though data are available
            XII.  QRA quality                          0  Failure to provide references (or an auditable internal refer-
                                                         encing system) for quoted frequency and probability data
            The above case studies are based on numerical analyses tech-   0  Use  of insufficient  sources  for frequency  and probability
            niques, making them at least akin to QRA-type evaluations. It is   data
            useful to examine characteristics that might make one QRA-   0  Lack ofattention to risk reduction measures.
            type approach  generally more complete  or  more useful as a
            valid measure of risk. The following lists are extracted from   The following are features that may indicate a high-quality
            checklists offered by a well-known practitioner of QRA, as a   QRA, equal to the best QRAs currently being performed:
            means of evaluating the QRA study itself.
              Reference [91] states that from an analyst’s point of view, a   0  Use of formal hazard identification procedure linked to fail-
             QRA study can be thought of as having three general stages:   ure case generation
                                                       0  Use of intelligent failure case and accident scenario selection
                                                         Use of validated software for modeling
             TOP                                         Use of audited software for risk summation
              Establishing the objectives and scope ofthe study   0  Documentation of all input data and modeling assumptions
              Collecting all relevant information       0  Traceability of risk results through intermediate  results to
              Identifying what can go wrong              input data
                                                       0  Quantitative uncertainty analysis, including identification of
             MIDDLE                                      the most critical assumptions and exploration of the effects
              Estimating event frequencies               of alternatives (Note that the existence and application of an
              Performing consequence modeling            uncertainty analysis is a better indicator of quality than the
              Calculating risk results                   degree of uncertainty that is estimated.)
                                                        0  A smooth  FN  curve Experience with FN  curves has  sug-
             TAIL                                        gested  that  more  detailed  analyses,  especially  those  with
              Investigating risk reduction measures      intelligently selected failure cases, tend to produce smoothly
              Developing cost-effective solutions        rounded F’N  curves, whereas less detailed studies produce
              Communicating the results                  FN curves with large discontinuities (unless some additional
                                                         smoothing is used).
              From a client’s point of view, many QRAs seem to place too   0  Use  of actual  accident  experience  in  developing accident
             much  emphasis on the technical details in the middle, at  the   scenarios and validating risk results [91].
             expense of the top and, more notably, the tail. This is perhaps not
             unexpected since the middle part is the most technically demand-   However, many ofthese aspects might not be ofhigh value to
             ing. However, the tail part is arguably the most valuable to the   the user of the analysis, so not all of these ingredients is neces-
             client since it is usually acritical aspect of decision making.   sarily appropriate for every study.
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