Page 233 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

210 Notes

Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least one of the
participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of consensual
action is only apparently being maintained, the manipulator deceives at
least one of the other participants about his own strategic attitude, in
which he delzberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.
3. K.-O. Apel, “Sprechakttheorie und transzendentale Sprachpragmatik
—zur Frage ethischer Normen,” in K.-O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und
Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 10-173.
4. In the framework of Southwest German Neo-Kantianism, Emil
Lask earlier reconstructed the concept of “transsubjective validity’”—
in connection with the meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of
statements, and the beauty of works of art—as worthiness to be recog-
nized. Lask’s philosophy of validity combines motifs from Lotze, Bolzano,
Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. “Genuine value is worthiness to be rec-
ognized, recognition-value, that which deserves submission, that to which
it is due, thus that which demands or requires it. To be valid is value,
demand, norm.... All such terms as ‘worthiness,’ ‘deserve,’ ‘be due,’
‘demand’ are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior cor-
responding to validity—worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way,
it demands a certain behavior.’”’ E. Lask, “Zum System der Logik,” Ges.
Schriften, vol. 3 (Tubingen, 1924), p. 92.
5. Y. Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this in his critique: “On Habermas’
Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language,” Synthese 26 (1973) :1-12. His
critique is based on a paper I characterized as provisional: ‘“Vorbereitende
Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz,” in J.
Habermas and N. Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtech-
nologie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101-141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, misunder-
stood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in de-
tail. I only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly
programmatic) approach clear even to readers who are aggressively in-
clined and hermeneutically not especially open.
6. E.g., K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt,
1971), pp. 406 ff., and “Programmatische Bemerkungen zur Idee einer
transzendentalen Sprachpragmatik,” in Annales Universitatis Tukuensis
Sarja, Series B, Osa Tom 126 (Tuku, 1973), pp. 11-35.
7. Charles Morris, “Foundations of the Theory of Signs,” in Excyclo-
pedia of Unified Science vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago, 1938), and Signs, Lan-
guage, Behavior (New York, 1955).
8. Cf. my remarks on Morris in Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften
(Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 150 ff.
9. Bar-Hillel, ‘“Indexical Expressions,” in Aspects of Language (Jerusa-
lem, 1970), pp. 69-88, and “Semantics and Communication,” in H. Heid-
tich, Semantics and Communication (Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 1-36. Tak-
ing Bar-Hillel as his point of departure, A. Kasher has proposed a formal
representation embedding linguistic expressions in extralinguistic contexts.