Page 235 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

212 Notes

21. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1964).
22. J. Bennett, “The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy,” Foundations of
Language 10 (1973):141-168; and S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford,
1972).
23. Cf. the bibliography by E. von Savigny in J. L. Austin, Zar Theorie
der Sprechakte (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 203 ff.
24. G. Grewendorf, “Sprache ohne Kontext,” in D. Wunderlich, ed.,
Linguistische Pragmatik, pp. 144-182.
25. H. P. Grice, “Meaning,” Philosophical Review 66(1957) :377-388,
and “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning,” Foun-
dations of Language 4 (1968):225-242; and D. K. Lewis, Convention
(Cambridge, 1969).
26. J. Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 184 ff.
27. H. G. Gadamer emphasizes this in Truth and Method (New York,
1975).
28. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London, 1949); cf. the interpreta-
tion of E. von Savigny in Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache (Frank-
furt, 1974), pp. 91 ff.
29. R. Carnap, W. Stegmiiller, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit
(Wien, 1959), p. 15.
30. D. Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), P.
209.
31. For an analysis of what explication in the sense of rational recon-
struction means, cf. H. Schnadelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt,
1977), the chapter on “Explikativer Diskurs,” pp. 277-336.
32. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.,
1965).
33. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 210-218.
34. R. P. Botha, Justification, pp. 75 ff., speaks in this connection of
external versus internal linguistic evidence.
35. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, p. 216. If I understand correctly,
Schnelle gives an empirical interpretation to the model-theoretic version
of linguistics in Sprachphilosophie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973), pp.
82-114.
36. Botha, Justification, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only re-
port correct linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false intuitions;
but the construct of pretheoretical knowledge does not allow of this pos-
sibility. I think it makes sense to start from the idea that linguistic intui-
tions can be “false” only if they come from incompetent speakers. An-
other problem is the interplay of grammatical and nongrammatical (e.g.,
perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse judgments
about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating ex-
pressions of grammatical rule-consciousness, of isolating genuinely lin-
guistic intuitions.