Page 238 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

215 Notes

Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972). H.
Schnelle, Sprachphilosophie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973) is also typ-
ical of methodological behaviorism in linguistics.
58. J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962); cf.
the bibliography on the theory of speech acts compiled by E. von Savigny
for the German edition of this work (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 204-209. J. L.
Austin, ““Performative Utterances,” in Philosophical Papers (Oxford,
1970), Ppp. 233-252, and ‘Performative-Constative,” in C. E. Caton, ed.,
Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, Ill., 1963), pp. 22-33. Ad-
ditional Austin bibliography can be found in von Savigny, Die Philoso-
phie der normalen Sprache, pp. 162-166.
See also J. R. Searle: “What is a Speech Act?,” in M. Black, ed., PAi-
losophy in America (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239, reprinted in Rosenberg
and Travis, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 614-628; “Austin on Locutionary and Ilocution-
ary Acts,” Philosophical Review 77 (1968) :405-424, reprinted in ibid.,
pp. 262-275; Speech Acts (London, 1969); and “Linguistik und Sprach-
philosophie,” in Bartsch and Vennemann, Linguistik und Nachbarwissen-
Schaften, pp. 111-126.
Other sources include: W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language, and
“Linguistic Acts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 1(1964):138-146;
L. J. Cohen, “Do Ilocutionary Forces Exist?,”’ Philosophical Quarterly 14
(1964) :118-137, reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 580—
598, and “Speech Acs,” Current Trends in Linguistics 12 (1970); R. M.
Hare, “Meaning and Speech Acts,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970) :3-24,
and “Austin’s Distinction between Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,”
in Hare, Practical Inferences (London, 1972); D. Holdcroft, ‘‘Performa-
tives and Statements,’ Mind 83 (1974):1-18; P. F. Strawson, “Intention
and Convention in Speech Acts,” Philosophical Review 73 (1964) :439-
460, reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 599-613; S. Thau,
“The Distinction between Ebetic and Ilocutionary Acts,” Azalyszs 32
(1972/73 ):177~183; C. Travis, “A Generative Theory of Speech Acts,”
in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 629-644; G. J. Warnock, “Hare
on Meaning and Speech Acts,’ Philosophical Review 80 (1971) :80-84;
Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik, pp. 309-352.
59. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3 ff.
6o. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle’s
principle of expressibility.
61. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959); M. Dummet, Frege,
Philosophy of Language (London, 1973); E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen
zur Einfuibrung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1976).
62. On the analysis of intentionality and the expression of intentions,
cf. W. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Metaphysics
(London, 1968); W. Sellars and R. Chisholm, “‘Intentionality and the
Mental,” in Minnesota Studies, vol. 1 (1963), pp. 507-539; Sellars, Scz-