Page 241 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

218 Notes

80. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic
subtheories, that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory
of elementary sentences (and that of intentional expressions) can make
its specific contribution to the theory of meaning. In Austin’s choice of
the terms meaning and force, there resonates still the descriptivist preju-
dice—a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of date since Wittgen-
stein at the latest, if not since Humboldt—according to which the theory
of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can
claim a monopoly on the theory of meaning. (Naturally reference seman-
)
tics also lives from this prejudice.
8x. Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 132.
82. Ibid., pp. 147-148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64 ff.
83. Austin, “Performative Utterances,” p. 248.
84. Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 144.
85. Ibid., pp. 145 ff. Cf. also ‘“Performative-Constative,” p. 31:
To begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance
is not unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in
all sincerity, that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all
criticism. It may always be criticized in a different dimension. Let us suppose
that I say to you “J advise you to do it’; and let us allow that all the circum-
stances are appropriate, the conditions for success are fulfilled. In saying
that, I actually do advise you to do it—it is not that I state, truely or falsely,
that 1 advise you. It is, then, a performative utterance. There does still arise,
all the same, a little question: was the advice good or bad? Agreed, I spoke
in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your interest; but was I
right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? Or again—though
perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out, in your
interest? There is confrontation of my utterance with the situation in, and
the situation with respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified per-
haps, but was IJ right?
86. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144-145.
87. J. Habermas, “Vorbereitende Bemerkungen,” pp. 111 ff.
88. Austin, “Performative Utterances,” pp. 250-251.
89. Ibid., p. 251.
90. Austin, “Performative-Constative,” pp. 31-32.
91. Searle, Speech Acts, p. 63.
92. On Wunderlich’s analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349 ff.)
the general context conditions would be as follows:
S makes it understood that (that is, S should give the advice only if these
conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they obtain)
:
1 S knows, believes, or assumes (depending on preceding communication)
that
a) H finds himself in an unpleasant situation Z;
b) H wants or desires to reach some other, more pleasant situation Z’ 54
Z;
c) H does not know how Z’ can be reached;
d) H is in a position to do 4.