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214                        Notes

         Leuninger,  “Linguistik  und  Psychologie,”  in  R.  Bartsch  and  Vennemenn,
         eds.,  Linguistik  und  Nachbarwissenschaften  (Kronberg,  1973),  pp.  225-
         241.
           43.  E.  H.  Lenneberg,  Biologische  Grundlagen  der  Sprache  (Frankfurt,
         1972),  and  “Ein  Wort  unter  uns,”  in  Leuninger  et  al.,  Linguistik  und
         Psychologie,  pp.  53-72.
           44.  L.  Kohlberg,  “Stage  and  Sequence,”  in  D.  Goslin,  ed.,  Handbook
         of  Socialization  Theory  and  Research  (Chicago,  1969),  and  “From  is  to
         Ought,”  in  T.  Mischel,  ed.,  Cognitive  Development  and  Epistemology
         (New  York,  1971),  pp.  151-236.
           45.  On  this  point,  cf.  U.  Oevermann,  ‘““Kompetenz  und  Peformanz,”
         unpubl.  MS,  Max-Planck-Institut  fur  Bildungsforschung  (1974).
           46.  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  N.  Kemp  Smith,  trans.  (New
         York,  1961),  p.  138.
           47.  B.  Stroud,  ‘Transcendental  Arguments,”  Journal  of  Philosophy  9
         (1968)  :241-254;  M.  S.  Gram,  “Transcendental  Arguments,”  Nozs  5
         (1971)  :15-26;  J.  Hintikka,  “Transcendental  Arguments,”  Nows  6  (1972):
         174-281;  and  M.  S.  Gram,  “Categories  and  Transcendental  Arguments,”
         Man  and  World  6  (1973)  :252-269.
           48.  R.  Bittner,  “Transzendental,”  in  Handbuch  philosophischer  Grund-
         begriffe,  vol.  5  (Munich,  1974),  pp.  1524-1539.
           49.  For  example,  the  Kant  reception  of  the  Erlangen  school  assumes
         a  transcendental  status  for  the  basic  concepts  of  protophysics  only  in  a
         limited  sense;  cf.  the  discussion  volume  edited  by  G.  Bohme,  Protophysik
         (Frankfurt,  1975).
           50.  Piaget’s  Kantianism  is  typical  of  this  approach.
           51.  Cf.  K.-O.  Apel’s  introductions  to  volumes  1  and  2  of  C.  S.  Peirce’s
         Schriften  (Frankfurt,  1967  and  1970).
           52.  Cf.  my  “Postscript  to  Knowledge  and  Human  Interests,”  Philoso-
         phy  of  the  Social  Sciences  3(1973):157—189;  cf.  also  R.  Bubner,  “Trans-
         zendentale  Hermeneutik,”  in  Simon-Schafer  and  Zimmerli,  eds.,  Wissen-
         schafistheorie  der  Geisteswissenschaften  (Hamburg,  1975),  pp.  57-70.
           53.  F.  Kambartel,  Erfahrung  und  Struktur  (Frankfurt,  1968).
           54.  J.  Habermas,  ‘““Wahrheitstheorien,”  in  Festschrift  fir  Walter  Schulz
         (Pfullingen,  1973),  pp.  211-265.
           55.  W.  Sellars,  ‘‘Presupposing,”  Philosophical  Review  63  (1954)  :197-
         215;  P.  F.  Strawson,  “A  Reply  to  Mr.  Sellars,”  Philosophical  Review  63
         (1954)  !216-231.
           56.  U.   Oevermann,   “Theorie  der  individuellen  Bildungsprozesse,”
         unpubl.  MS,  Max-Planck-Institut  fiir  Bildungsforschung  (1974).
           57.  On  this  point,  cf.  the  controversy  between  Quine  and  Chomsky:
         N.  Chomsky,  “Quine’s  Empirical  Assumptions,”  and  W.  V.  O.  Quine,
         “Replies,”  both  in  Davidson  and  Hintikka,  eds.,  Words  and  Objections
         (Dordrecht,  1969),  pp.  53-68  and  292-352;  W.  V.  O.  Quine,  “Method-
         ological  Reflections  on  Current  Linguistic  Theory,’  in  Davidson  and
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