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220 Notes

7. Ego Psychology: H. S. Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry
(New York, 1940) and The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New
York, 1953); E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, 1963)
and Identity and the Life Cycle (New York, 1959): N. Sanford, Self and
Society (New York, 1966); D. J. de Levita, Der Begriff der Identitat
(Frankfurt, 1971); and G. and R. Blanck, “Toward a Psychoanalytic
Developmental Psychology,” in Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association (1972) :668-710.
Developmental Psychology: J. Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the
Child (New York, 1965) and Biology and Knowledge (Chicago, 1971);
H. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969); L. Kohl-
berg, “Stage and Sequence,” in D. Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socializa-
tion Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969) and ‘From Is to Ought,” in
T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York,
1971), pp. 151-236; J. H. Flavell, T4e Development of Role-Taking and
Communication Skills in Children (New York, 1968); and H. Werner
and B. Kaplan, Symbol Formation (New York, 1963).
Interactionism: C. H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order
(New York, 1902); G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago,
1934); H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, Character and Social Structure (New
York, 1953); T. Parsons and R. F. Bales, Family Socialization and Inter-
action Process (Glencoe, 1964), chap. 2, pp. 35-133; C. Gordon and K. J.
Gergen, eds., Self im Social Interaction (New York, 1968); G. E. Swan-
son, “Mead and Freud, Their Relevance for Social Psychology,” in J. G.
Manis and B. N. Melzer, eds., Symbolic Interaction (Boston, 1967), pp.
25-45; L. Krappmann, Soziologische Dimension de Identitdt (Stuttgart,
1969); H. Dubiel, Identitat und Institution (Bielefeld, 1973); and N. K.
Denzin, “The Genesis of the Self in Early Childhood,” in The Sociologi-
cal Quarterly (1972) :291-314.
8. J. Habermas, “Notizen zum Begriff der Rollenkompetenz,’ in Kultur
und Kritik, pp. 195-231.
9. “At the center of every psychological theory of development stands
the concept of developmental stages. This has been worked out in its
strongest and most precise form within the cognitivist tradition (Piaget,
Kohlberg). These authors speak of stages of cognitive development only
under the following conditions (J. H. Flavell, “An Analysis of Cognitive
Developmental Sequences,’ in Genetic Psychology Monographs 86
(1972) :!279-350):(a) The cognitive schemata of the individual phases
are qualitatively distinct from one another, and the individual elements
of a phase-specific style of thought are so related to one another that they
form a structured whole. Specific modes of behavior are not merely object-
specific, externally stimulated responses; rather they can be interpreted as
derivatives of a specific form of structuring the environment. (b) The
phase-specific schemata are ordered in an invariant and hierarchically
Structured sequence. This means that no later phase can be attained with-