Page 84 - Communication and the Evolution of Society
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61                         What  Is  Universal  Pragmatics?

         a  repertory  from  which  the  acting  subject,  with  the  help  of  a
         finite  number  of  types,  can  put  together  any  number  of  norm-
         conformative  actions.
           The  peculiar  force  of  the  illocutionary—which  in  the  case  of
         institutionally  unbound  speech  actions  is  not  borrowed  directly
         from  the  validity  of  established  norms  of  action—cannot  be  ex-
         plained  by  means  of  the  speech-act-typical  context  restrictions.
         This  is  possible  only  with  the  help  of  the  specific  presuppositions
         that  Searle  introduces  under  the  title  “‘essential  rules.”’  In  doing
         so,  he  appears,  it  is  true,  to  succeed  only  in  paraphrasing  the
         meaning  of  the  corresponding  performative  verbs  (for  example,
         requests:  “count  as  an  attempt  to  get  H  to  do  A”;  or  questions:
         “count  as  an  attempt  to  elicit  information  from  H’’).  It  is  inter-
         esting,  however,  that  these  circumscriptions  include  the  common
         determination,  “‘count  as  an  attempt...’  The  essential  presup-
         position  for  the  success  of  an  illocutionary  act  consists  in  the
         speaker's  entering  into  a  specific  engagement,  so  that  the  hearer
         can  rely  on  him.  An  utterance  can  count  as  a  promise,  assertion,
         request,  question,  or  avowal,  if  and  only  if  the  speaker  makes  an
         offer  that  he  is  ready  to  make  good  insofar  as  it  is  accepted  by  the
         hearer.  The  speaker  must  engage  himself,  that  is,  indicate  that  in
         certain  situations  he  will  draw  certain  consequences  for  action.
         The  content  of  the  engagement**  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the
         sincerity  of  the  engagement.  This  condition,  introduced  by  Searle
         as  the  “‘sincerity  rule,”  must  always  be  fulfilled  in  the  case  of
         communicative  action  that  is  oriented  to  reaching  understanding.
         Thus  in  what  follows  I  shall,  in  speaking  of  the  speaker's  en-
         gagement,  presuppose  both  a  certain  content  of  engagement  and
         the  sincerity  with  which  the  speaker  is  willing  to  enter  into  his
         engagement.  So  far  as  I  can  see,  previous  analyses  of  speech  acts
         have  been  unsatisfactory,  as  they  have  not  clarified  the  engage-
         ment  of  the  speaker,  on  which  the  acceptability  of  his  utterance
         specifically  depends.
           The  discernible  and  sincere  readiness  of  the  speaker  to  enter
         into  a  specific  kind  of  interpersonal  bond  has,  compared  with
         the  general  context  conditions,  a  peculiar  status.  The  restricted
         contexts  that  specific  types  of  speech  actions  presuppose  must  (a)
         be  given,  and  (b)  be  supposed  to  exist  by  the  participants.  Thus
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