Page 85 - Communication and the Evolution of Society

62 Communication and Evolution of Society

the following two statements must hold: (a) a statement to the
effect that certain contexts obtain, indeed those required by the
type in question; and (b) a statement to the effect that speaker
and hearer suppose these contexts to obtain. The spec#fic presup-
position of speaker engagement, on the other hand, should not
be analyzed in the same way, that is, so as to yield the following
two statements: (a) a statement to the effect that there is a cer-
tain engagement on the part of the speaker; and (b) a statement
to the effect that the hearer supposes this speaker engagement to
obtain. One could choose this strategy of analysis; but I regard it
as unsuitable. It would suggest that we speak of the existence of
an engagement in the same sense as we speak of the existence
of restricted contexts. I can ascertain in an appropriate manner,
through observation or questioning, whether or not conditions of
generalized contexts obtain; on the other hand, I can only test
whether a speaker engages himself in a specific way and com-
mits himself to certain consequences for action; I can ascertain
at best whether there are sufficient indicators for the conjecture
that the offer would withstand testing.
The bond into which the speaker is willing to enter with the
performance of an illocutionary act means a guarantee that, in
consequence of his utterance, he will fulfill certain conditions—
for example, regard a question as settled when a satisfactory an-
swer is given; drop an assertion when it proves to be false; follow
his own advice when he finds himself in the same situation as the
hearer; stress a request when it is not complied with; act in ac-
cordance with an intention disclosed by avowal, and so on. Thus
the illocutionary force of an acceptable speech act consists in the
fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical
commitments of the speaker. But if illocutionary force has more
than a suggestive influence, what can motivate the hearer to base
his action on the premise that the speaker seriously intends the
engagement he indicates? When it is a question of institutionally
bound speech actions, he can perhaps rely on the binding force
of an established norm of action. In the case of institutionally
unbound speech acts, however, illocutionary force cannot be
traced back directly to the binding force of the normative context.
The illocutionary force with which the speaker, in carrying out