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Social Movements 93


                    movement involves achieving routine access to the political process. This
                    premise is also problematized, however, by the incorporation of concerns
                    with subjectivity and culture into the theory. If participation in a social
                    movement depends on how individuals understand themselves and their
                    situation, there seems to be no good reason for ignoring the contestation
                    of perspectives and the transformation of identities in civil society as if
                    this were not itself an aspect of politics. The extension of RMT to include
                    such issues, however, again points beyond the liberal paradigm, and is,

                    therefore, somewhat difficult for its adherents to accept.

                          R esource  M obilization  T heory: the  p remises

                      The contribution to rational choice theory that has been most infl uential
                    in RMT is  The Logic of Collective Action  (1968) by Mancur Olson.
                    As Scott points out, the theory of social behavior outlined in this book is
                    established on the basis of two premises drawn from neo - classical eco-
                    nomics: fi rst, that social choices are to be explained with reference to
                    individual preferences; and, second, that individuals act rationally to
                    maximize their interests and minimize their costs (Scott,  1990 : 10). Olson
                    is interested by the idea that there is no necessary connection between
                    collective interests and collective action. On the contrary:


                           If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal
                       welfare, they will  not  act to advance their common or group objectives
                       unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate
                       incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest,
                       is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition
                       that they help bear the costs or burdens of the group objectives. (Olson,
                         1968 : 2)

                      This is the famous  “ free - rider ”  problem of rational choice theorists. It is
                    in the very nature of a public good that no individual in a particular group
                    can feasibly be prevented from benefi ting from it if it is enjoyed by others
                    in that group. Because the participation of a single individual makes so
                    little difference to the achievement of a public good, it is more rational
                    to gain it without participating in collective action, unless the group can
                    somehow reward or punish particular individuals in direct proportion to

                    their degree of participation. This is very difficult to do, impossible even,
                    for a social movement intent on changing the very rules and structures
                    by which a category of persons is systematically disadvantaged in relation
                    to others.
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