Page 182 - Decoding Culture
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THE  RISE  F   THE  READER  175
                                               O
           incorporated within the research  (d. Ang,  1996). The underlying
           threads here are relativism and constructivism:  the relativism of
          knowledge claims and the consequent risk of an endless spiral of
           irreconcilable  accounts,  constructed  from  the  various points  of
          view of participants and observers, and undermining the possibil­
          ity of any meaningful intervention in, or generalized understanding
           of, culture in society.
             Conventionalist  epistemologies  always  risk  this  paralysis  in
          which the  impossibility of certainty  leads  to  a contextualist and
           reflexive retreat from  making any claims  at all. The  solution,  if
           solution  it  be,  is to  recognize  that the  partiality of truth  claims,
           and the potential multiplicity of accounts of social process, do not
          necessitate our discarding all forms of epistemological realism. By
          this  I  do not mean that we  should  return to  a version  of simple
          ethnographic  realism  in  which  the  ethnographer unproblemati­
          cally  represents  the  real  world  of the  researched.  Rather, with
           Hammersley  (1992: 50)  we should accept that  [ wle can maintain
                                                   '
          belief in  the  existence  of phenomena  independent  of our claims
          about them,  and  in their knowability,  without assuming that we
           can have unmediated contact with them and therefore that we can
          know with  certainty  whether  our knowledge  of them  is valid  or
          invalid'.  Hammersley writes  of this approach  as  'subtle realism',
          arguing  that  it  offers an  alternative  to  the  simple  polarization
          between naive forms of relativism and realism in modern discus­
          sions of ethnography.
             The  philosophy  of social  science  literature  of recent years
          offers him some support, at least in as much as defences of real­
          ism have proliferated. My own preference is for a development of
          the kinds of arguments advanced by Bhaskar  (1979, 1987), who is
          not only concerned to  establish  a realist epistemology but also
          focuses  upon  ways  of conceptualizing  relations between  social
          structure and agency. Broadly speaking, I would want to argue for





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