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Risk assessment model 13/273
               detected in I  day, even though the same amount of product is   Station stuffing  As  an opportunity  to detect  and react to  a
               spilled  in  either  case.  Unknown  and  complex  interactions   leak, the  staffing  level of  a facility can  be  evaluated by  the
               between  small  spills,  subsurface  transport,  and  groundwater   following relationship:
               contamination, as well as the increased ground transport oppor-
               tunity, account for the increased chronic hazard.   Opportunity to detect = [(inspection hours) + (happenstance detection)]
                 One application of such an amplification factor established
               an equivalency by saying that a 200,000-barrel (bbl) contain-   where
               ment area with very good leak detection capabilities is roughly   Inspection hour   =an inspection that occurs within each
               equivalent to a 500-bbl  containment area with very poor leak   hour
               detection capabilities-from  a risk perspective. The larger con-   Happenstance detection = 50% ofmanned time per week.
               tainment  area has a greater potential  leak volume due to its
               larger stored volume, but either can produce a smaller, but con-   In  this  relationship,  it  is  assumed  that  station  personnel
               sequential leak. Making these two scenarios equivalent empha-   would have a 50% chance of detecting any size leak while they
               sizes the importance of leak detection capabilities and limits   were on site. This is of course a simplification since some leaks
               the  ‘penalty’  associated  with  higher  storage  volumes.  This   would not be detectable and others (larger in  size) would be
               equivalency seems to be reasonable, although any ratio will suit   100% detectable by  sound, sight, or odor. Additional  factors
               the purposes of a relative assessment. With a desired amplifica-   that are ignored in the interest of simplicity include training,
               tion factor fixed, various combinations of containment volume   thoroughness  of  inspection,  and  product  characteristics  that
               and leak detection capabilities can be assessed, used to produce   assist in detectability.
               spill scores, and then compared on a relative basis.   An  alternate approach to evaluating the staffing level as it
                Improvements to the spill score are made by reducing the   relates  to  detection  is  to  consider  the  maximum  interval  in
               product containment volume in the case of volume-dependent   which the station is unmanned:
               spills, and by reducing the source (e.g., pressure, density, head,
               hole, time-to-detect) in the case of rate-dependent spills. Note
               that improvements in leak detection also effectively reduce the   Worst case = maximum interval unobserved
               source, in the leak-rate dependent case.
                In assessing station leak detection capabilities, all opportuni-   Examples of evaluating various staffing protocols using the
               ties to detect can be considered. Therefore, leak detection sys-   two techniques are shown in Table 13.6. The last column shows
               tems that can be evaluated are shown in Table 13.5. The time to   the results  of a “maximum  interval unobserved”  calculation
               detect various leak volumes (T, through T,,,,,   in Table 13.5,   while the next to the last column shows the “opportunity  to
               representing volumes from 1 bbl to 1000 bbl of spilled product   detect” calculation.
               and defined in Table 7.1 3) can be estimated to produce a leak   The maximum  unobserved  interval method  is simple,  but  it
               detection curve similar to Figure 7.7 for each type of leak detec-   appears worthwhile to also consider the slightly more compli-
               tion as well as for the combined capabilities at the station. The   cated “opportunity” method, since the “max interval” method
               second column, reaction time, is for an estimate of how long it   ignores the benefit of actions taken while a station is manned,
               would take to isolate and contain the leak, after detection. This   that is, while performing formal inspections of station equip-
               recognizes that some leak detection opportunities, such as 24-7   ment-rounds.   The  “opportunity”  method,  while  providing
               staffing  of  a  station,  provide  for  more  immediate  reactions   similar relative scores, also shows benefits that more closely
               compared to patrol or off-site SCADA monitoring. This can be   agree  with  the  belief  that  more  directed  attention  during
               factored  into  assessments  that place  values  on  various  leak   episodes  of  occupancy  (performing  inspection  rounds)  are
               detection methodologies.                   valuable.

               Table 13.5  Leak detection opportunities

               Leukdetection system            Reaction time   Ti       T,,        TI 00     ~Iooo
               7 x 24 manning with formal. scheduled “rounds”
               5 x 8 staffing with formal, scheduled rounds
               7 x 24 staffing, no formal rounds
               5 x> 8 staffing, no formal rounds
               Other staffing combinations
               Occasional site visits (weekly)
               Mass balance for facility
               Mass balance for station
               Pressure point analysis
               Acoustic monitoring
               SCADA real-time monitoring
               Groundwater monitoring
               Surface drain system (monitored)
               Soil vapor monitoring
               Passerby reporting
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