Page 373 - Bruce Ellig - The Complete Guide to Executive Compensation (2007)
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Chapter 7. Short-Term Incentives                  359


                                            Actual Results

               Company Results      Previous Year      Last Year         % Change
               Sales per share         $22.53            $21.49           95.4%
               Earnings per share*       2.34              2.41           103.0%*

               Incentive Plan Formula
               Sales per share   95.4% of target   0
               Earnings per share  95.4% of target   0
               Total                           0% of salary

                                   Recalculated for Ongoing Businesses

               Company Results      Previous Year      Last Year         % Change
               Sales per share         $19.24            $20.43           106.2%
               Earnings per share*       2.86             3.06            107.0%*

               Incentive Plan Formula
               Sales per share    106.2% of target   31.2%
               Earnings per share  106.2% of target   31.2%
               Total                            62.4% of salary

               * Cannot exceed increase in sales per share
           Table 7-10. Look-forward possible incentive payouts


               An example of an add-on approach is shown in Table 7-11. Note that the threshold
           payment is 20 percent of the normal award if the peer group’s EPS is 120 percent of the
           company’s, and the maximum payment is double the target if the peer performance is
           75 percent of the company’s.
               Table 7-12 shows another example of bonus adjustment based on corporate performance
           versus a peer group. Note that if percentage change in EPS were the same as the peer
           group, the CEO would receive 100 percent of this performance-based bonus. However, if
           the company EPS increase were 10 percent better than the peer group, then the CEO
           bonus would be increased by 10 percent (i.e., 10    1%). Conversely, if the peer group
           were 20 percent better than the company, the CEO’s bonus would be reduced to 60 percent
           of its performance-based amount [i.e., 100   (20   2)]. The amounts for the chief operating
           officer (COO), chief financial officer (CFO), and chief legal officer (CLO) would be adjust-
           ed in a similar manner.
               Shareholders like the penalty aspect of this type of formula, if outperformed by the peer
           group. However, they do not like paying a substantial award in a year when the company
           outperformed the peers but had a bad year, although not as bad as its peers. The other
           downside is the often difficult job of getting good peer data.
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