Page 99 - Decoding Culture
P. 99

92  D E C O D I N G   C U L TURE

           Against this tendency Althusser argued that there was an episte­
           mological  break  in  Marx's  work,  separating  the  youthful
           philosophical  speculations from the  mature,  anti-essentialist sci­
           ence of his 'theoretical anti-humanism' (Althusser,  1969: 227-231).
           In the course of establishing his reading of Marx, Althusser con­
           tributed significantly to a wide range of issues in marxist theory.
           However, it was his distinctive epistemology and his theory of ide­
           ology that most strongly influenced both Screen theory and 1970s
           cultural studies more generally, and it is on these elements of his
          work that I shall focus here.
             Let me begin with epistemology. The twin pillars of Althusser's
           view of knowledge  are  his  thoroughgoing  anti-empiricism  and,
           allied to it, his commitment to the view that a science's object of
           inquiry is always theoretically constituted. This can best be under­
           stood in relation to what he calls 'theoretical practice'. 'Scientific'
           theoretical practice,  as  opposed  to  'ideological' theoretical prac­
           tice,  is  a  process  of  production  whereby  'raw  material'  is
           transformed into knowledge.  However,  this is not  (as in empiri­
           cism)  a process whereby  'facts'  are  persuaded  to  give  up their
           essence,  because the raw material upon which science works is
           always conceptual  and the transformation is therefore from one
           kind  of concept to  another. When  a  science  is first constituted,
           Althusser (1969:  184) writes, it 'does not "work" on a purely objec­
           tive "given", that of pure and absolute "facts". On the contrary, its
           particular labour  consists of elaborating  its  own  scientific f a cts
           through a critique of the ideological 'facts" elaborated by an earlier
           ideological theoretical practice.' Even when it is fully constituted,
           science still 'works' on concepts,  though now they may be ideo­
           logical  as  before,  or  'facts'  within  the  terms  of the  scientific
           theoretical practice,  or concepts from an earlier phase of the sci­
           ence.  In his  distinctive  (and revealing)  language, the  process  is
           one  whereby  Generality  II  works  on  Generality  I  to  produce





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