Page 245 - Global Project Management Handbook

12-6 COMPETENCY FACTORS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT

opposed to being owned and operated by the national government or private indus-
try. Setting these policies would be part of implementing level 1 capacity building.
● Level 2. Once the level 1 policies were set, then national laws and regulatory framework
would need to be set in place that all municipal water utilities would follow.
● Level 3. Stakeholders in the municipal water utility would include the management of
the water utility, the employees, the municipal government, the citizens or customers,
and the national-level function that managed water resources for Iraq. Establishing the
functions of each group and how they would interrelate would be a level 3 function.
● Level 4. Within the administration building, such functions as payroll, customer billing,
customer service, engineering, and other administrative functions would occur. Planning,
designing, and training personnel to implement these systems would be level 4 training.
● Level 5. Conducting training so that the city workers could effectively and efficiently
operate the water plant.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM

IRRF I
Implementation of the IRRF I program began in the summer of 2003 with two interna-
tionally renowned DB firms beginning the RIO and RIE programs. All contracts were
cost-plus, and the focus was on speed. Many projects were started simultaneously, and
virtually every project ran substantially over budget. Unfortunately, the budgeted
money ran out before all the projects were completed. In fact, many projects were left
in partial-completion mode. Funding the completion of theses projects with alternative
funding was a continuing challenge in 2004. Further, the performance on these pro-
grams did not meet the expectations of key stakeholders in Iraq; thus IRRF I created
an initial negative image of the rebuilding effort.

Mobilization for IRRF II

Contracts with the SPMOCs and the DB firms were signed on March 9, 2004. The
contractors began to mobilize their teams to Baghdad in April of 2004. By May 2004,
critical mass to manage the program was in place in Baghdad. At this point, the state
of the program organization within PMO was as follows:
● Each of the six sectors had three to six government people.
● Further, for each sector, there was a sector contractor (SPMOC) team in place consist-
ing of typically 10 to 30 people. By the end of the summer of 2004, each SPMOC had
staffs of about 50 people in Baghdad.
● In the spring of 2004, the staffing in each sector to plan and begin implementation of the
work was inadequate, and determination to get the work done was high. Thus the sector
government teams and the SPMOC teams worked long hours and worked closely
together, and roles blurred because the focus was on getting the job done, not on worry-
ing about whose role was what. In this time period and throughout all of 2004, 7-day
workweeks with 12-hour work days were standard.
During the same time period, the DB contractors began to mobilize to Iraq.
Mobilization for the DB contractors was more difficult than for the SPMOCs. For each of
the SPMOCs, the government provided life support and office facilities in the Green