Page 250 - Global Project Management Handbook

LESSONS LEARNED: REBUILDING IRAQ IN 2004 12-11

infrastructure. It was not uncommon to find pumping stations that had not had annual
maintenance in a decade.
The collective impacts of lack of maintenance for several decades, the war, and
looting created a dilapidated infrastructure with many needs. In fact, the looting was
worse than anticipated, which caused many rehabilitation projects to become rebuilds.
Only 40 percent of the nation had access to potable water, and 90 percent of the sew-
erage went untreated. The lack of potable water was the main cause of the infant and
child mortality rate exceeding 10 percent. Further, the Sweet Water Canal that moved
water to the city of Basrah on the southern tip of Iraq failed on occasion, leaving the more
than 1 million residents of Basrah without water for a period of five or six days. And 1
million people without water on a 120ºF summer day become somewhat hostile.
Five million of Iraq’s 25 million citizens were without electricity. And the 20 million
who did have access to electricity would experience rolling blackouts, with electricity typi-
cally being available four to six hours per day. As one citizen said, “When it is over 100
degrees at night and you have no electricity and no air-conditioning, it is hard to think
about the benefits of democracy; show me electricity, and I will show you democracy.”
Lastly, many existing facilities were primitive in nature. For example, many rural
schools did not have bathroom facilities or electrical lighting. Thus school rehab pro-
jects focused on adding the basics such as bathrooms and electricity.

Stakeholder Management
When the program began, PMOs key stakeholders were the Iraqi ministers in
Baghdad. This quickly changed, and the following other stakeholders emerged:

● Local politicians. The governors of the governates and the mayors of the cities all
wanted to know what would happen when in their locality. They were very support-
ive of the rebuilding effort and had some specific goals, such as (1) to attract as
many projects as possible in their locale, (2) to drive some of the construction sub-
contracts to businesses in their locale, and (3) to be part of the process.
● The Multi-National Forces (MNFs). For military purposes, Iraqi was divided into six
geographic segments with an MNF led by a general in charge of each segment. The
MNFs believed that the quickest way to win the peace and the hearts and minds of the
Iraqi people was to build projects as fast as possible. Thus each general was vitally inter-

ested in what projects would be done in his area and when the project would start.
● Army Corp of Engineers. The corp was in charge of construction management on all
2500 projects, and as such, it was imperative for the PMO to create and maintain good
communications with corp offices throughout Iraq.
● Local contractors. Local contractors throughout Iraq wanted to be involved in the
rebuilding effort, and questions continuously arose relating to how a local contractor
could be awarded work. While the DB contractors were the only groups that could sub-
contract work, the questions from the local contractors usually would come to the PMO.
It then became an ongoing effort to link local contractors and the collation DB contrac-
tors together. To support the local contractors, the civil affairs function of the MNFs
often would set up business centers in cities to create a place for the DB contractors to
come and meet with local contractors.

Building a Regional Organization

When started in late 2003, the CPA was located in Baghdad only. As the program was
implemented in the spring of 2004, it was necessary to build a regional or outreach program