Page 249 - Global Project Management Handbook

12-10 COMPETENCY FACTORS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Creating Community-Based Programs
The fact that all project-selection decisions were being made by the Iraqi ministers in
Baghdad created a problem. Local officials, such as mayors and governors, felt left
out of the process, and further, they did not trust that any decision being made out of
Baghdad would be in their best interest.
Fortunately, in the spring of 2004, Iraqi oil money was becoming available. Since
at the time the CPA was occupying Iraq, that is, running the country, the CPA was
free to spend the Iraqi oil money as the CPA determined best. A fund called the
Defense Funds for Iraq (DFI) was established and was designated to fund community-
based programs. A nice characteristic of DFI funds was that unlike the IRRF funds,
they came without any strings attached. For example, (1) funding was not tied to a
certain sector, (2) implementation did not have to be done by a coalition DB contrac-
tor, and (3) the bureaucratic reporting was substantially reduced.
In April of 2004, the insurgency began to flare up in Fallajuh. In an effort to create
peace in Fallajuh and to build good relationships with the local leaders and citizens of
Fallajuh, the PMO sent representatives to Fallajuh to meet with local leaders to define and
designate projects to be funded with DFI money and implemented by local contractors.
This was the start of community-based programs where (1) local leaders selected
the projects, and (2) local contractors implemented the program.
The program in Fallajuh was successful and was expanded quickly to 6 additional
cites and then to a total of 10 cities. The program at this time was named the Accelerated
Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP). AIRP was considered a success for several reasons:
● Being community-based, it engaged the local politicians and power brokers.
● Projects were considerably more cost-effective because going direct to local contractors
avoided the administrative costs associated with the DB contractors.
● Speed of implementation was faster because there was no need to wait on the coalition
DBs to mobilize.
● The projects were being done totally by the Iraqis. With an Iraqi face on the projects,
the projects were safer. That is, the insurgents would tend to leave Iraqi-run projects
alone.
To support the rapid expansion of AIRP to several cities, a new organization was start-

ed within the CPA that consisted of a program leader and regional program managers.
Amazingly, the AIRP program was conceived, staffed, and implemented in a mat-
ter of months. By August 2004, over 300 AIRP projects had started.
Concurrently with the implementation of AIRP, another community-based local pro-
gram was enacted, that is, the Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP). CERP
was identical to AIRP, except CERP was lead and administered by the Multi-National
Forces (MFNs) in Iraq, whereas AIRP was lead and administered by the PMO.
A key issue with both the CERP and AIRP programs was the payment of local con-
tractors. The banking system in Iraq was weak, and there was no capability to complete
electronic transfers of funds. This forced both the military and the PMO to make cash
payments to the local Iraqi contractors. It was not unusual to move large quantities of
cash, $10 million, for example, from Baghdad to a given city to pay the local contractors.

The Starting Point
In general, the condition of infrastructure in Iraq was worst than we expected. While
Saddam had spent heavily to build palaces throughout the country and to build a few
spectacular projects, he tended to not allocate monies for maintenance of the current