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21. Other commentators have made similar distinctions between foreign
policy process versus outcome or process versus policy. For process
versus outcome, see Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, 39;
For process versus policy, see Warren Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 5.
22. These distinctions are reviewed in more detail in chapter 3.
23. Steven Livingston’s research takes a broad approach to foreign policy
and intervention, looking at eight different types: Conventional War,
Strategic Deterrence, Tactical Deterrence, Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), Peacemaking, Peacekeeping,
Imposed Humanitarian Interventions, and Consensual Humanitarian
Interventions. See Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect,” 11.
24. Steven Livingston uses the terms “accelerant” and “catalyst” to refer
to the same type of CNN effect. The former term is used in ibid., 2–4,
while the latter term is used in: Steven Livingston, “Media Coverage
of the War: An Empirical Assessment,” in Kosovo and the Challenge of
Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action,
and International Citizenship, ed. Albrecht Schanabel and Ramesh
Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), 361.
25. James F. Hoge Jr., “Media Pervasiveness,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4
(1994).
26. The benefits that transcontinental media networks can provide gov-
ernments through diplomacy are explored in more detail in the third
chapter. Such usage of the media falls outside the CNN effect, as
defined in this book.
27. Cited in Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and
Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989), 3.
28. This was a charge made often after the 1991 Gulf War. As veteran
American television commentator Marvin Kalb explained:
General Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, got on
television and urged journalists to “trust me” during the Gulf War.
They did, almost all of them, and they were then subjected to the most
sophisticated massage in the history of Pentagon salesmanship. . . In
this journalistic revolution, news organisations were routed by the
Pentagon through a clever use of pools and restrictive practices.
Marvin Kalb, “A View from the Press,” in Taken by Storm: The Media,
Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W. Lance
Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), 3–6. James Baker admitted the same point, stating, “The Gulf
War was quite a victory. But, who could not be moved by the sight of
that poor demoralized rabble—outwitted, outflanked, outmaneu-
vered by the U.S. military. But I think, given time, the press will
bounce back.” Cited in Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 19.
29. Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect,” 4–6.